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Executive summary 
Long-term success of family firms is of utmost social and economic 
importance. Three of its determinants are in the center of this Dissertation: firm-
level entrepreneurial orientation (EO), managers' entrepreneurial behavior, and 
value-creating attitudes of non-family employees. Each determinant and respective 
research gaps are addressed by one paper of this cumulative dissertation.  
Referring to firm-level EO, scholars claim that EO is a main antecedent to 
firms' both short- and long-term success. However, family firms seem to be 
successful across generations despite rather low levels of EO. The first paper 
addresses this paradox by investigating EO patterns of long-lived family firms in 
three Swiss case studies. The main finding is that the key to success is not to be as 
entrepreneurially as possible all the time, but to continuously adapt the EO profile 
depending on internal and external factors. Moreover, the paper suggest news 
subcategories to different EO dimensions. With regard to entrepreneurial behavior 
of managers, there is a lack of knowledge how individual-level and organizational-
level factors affect its evolvement.  
The second paper addresses this gap by investigating a sample of 403 middle-
level managers from both family and non-family firms. It introduces psychological 
ownership of managers as individual-level antecedent and investigates the 
interaction with organizational factors. As a central insight, management support is 
found to strengthen the psychological ownership-entrepreneurial behavior 
relationship.  
The third paper is based on the fact that employees' justice perceptions are 
established antecedents of value-creating employee attitudes such as affective 
commitment and job satisfaction. Even though family firms are susceptible to non-
family employees´ perceptions of injustice, corresponding research is scarce. 
Moreover, the mechanism connecting justice perceptions and positive outcomes is 
still unclear. Addressing these gaps, the analysis of a sample of 310 non-family 
VII 
employees reveals that psychological ownership is a mediator in the relationships 
between distributive justice perceptions and both affective commitment and job 
satisfaction.  
Altogether, the three papers offer valuable contributions to family business 
literature with respect to EO, entrepreneurial behavior, and value-creating 
employee attitudes. Thus, they increase current understanding about important 
determinants of family firms' long-term success, while opening up numerous ways 
of future research. 
1 
1 Introduction 
1.1 Main topic and structure  
In recent years, the field of family business research has grown remarkably 
(Sharma, 2004; Zahra & Sharma, 2004). While defining a family business can be 
challenging (Astrachan, Klein, & Smyrnios, 2002; Lank, 1997), scholars agree on 
family businesses' social and economic importance (Astrachan & Shanker, 2003; 
Sharma, 2004). Consequently, the determinants of their long-term success have 
attracted considerable scholarly attention. This Dissertation focuses on three 
particularly important ones. First, firm-level entrepreneurship in the form of 
entrepreneurial orientation (EO) has been identified as an essential success factor 
(Lumpkin & Dess, 1996; Nordqvist, Habbershon, & Melin, 2008; Rauch, Wiklund, 
Lumpkin, & Frese, 2009). Second, individual-level entrepreneurial behavior of 
employees, such as middle-level managers, has been established as a core element 
of effective corporate entrepreneurship, thus contributing indirectly to a firm's 
success (Hornsby, Kuratko, & Zahra, 2002; Kuratko, 2010; Kuratko, Ireland, 
Covin, & Hornsby, 2005). Third, scholars emphasize the importance of enhancing 
value-creating attitudes and behaviors of non-family employees to family firms' 
success in general (Barnett & Kellermanns, 2006; Chrisman, Chua, & Litz, 2003; 
Chua, Chrisman, & Sharma, 2003). Prominent employee attitudes are affective 
commitment (cp. Allen & Meyer, 1990; Meyer, Stanley, Herscovitch, & 
Topolnytsky, 2002) and job satisfaction (Colquitt, Conlon, Wesson, Porter, & Ng, 
2001; Judge, Thoresen, Bono, & Patton, 2001).  
Despite considerable scholarly efforts, however, important research gaps exist 
with respect to all these three antecedents to family firms´ long-term success. Each 
of the three papers of this cumulative Dissertation deals with one of these 
antecedents and addresses specific corresponding research gaps. The first paper is 
based on three Swiss case studies and investigates EO in long-lived family firms. 
The second paper is a quantitative study based on a sample of 403 middle-level 
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managers from both non-family and family firms. It examines how middle-level 
managers' entrepreneurial behavior can be enhanced by psychological ownership 
and organizational-level factors. The third paper is based on a sample of 310 non-
family employees and investigates how their value-creating attitudes can be 
fostered through justice perceptions and psychological ownership toward the 
family firm.  
The three papers offer valuable contributions to literature on three core 
elements of family firms´ long-term success, and thus increase our general 
understanding of how long-term success and performance of this unique 
organizational form can be achieved.  
This Dissertation is structured as follows. First, the remainder of chapter 1 
gives an overview about the definition of family firms, their economic and 
academic importance, as well as about firm-level and individual-level antecedents 
to their long-term success. Chapter 2 introduces the three papers. First, it illustrates 
the three specific research gaps that are addressed. Second, it presents the 
methodologies that are applied. Third, it depicts relevant characteristics of each 
paper. These follow in chapters 3, 4, and 5. Chapter 6 summarizes their respective 
contributions to theory and practice, addresses limitations, and presents promising 
avenues for future research, before the final conclusion is offered (see Figure 1).  
 
 
 
 
 
3 
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Figure 1: Dissertation structure  
 
1.2 Definition of family firms 
Family business scholars have been struggling to define a family business for a 
long time. Family firms are a very heterogeneous group with regard to size, branch, 
age, and structure (Birley, 2001; Handler, 1989; Sharma, 2003b). In addition, the 
level and characteristics of the family's involvement and influence on the business 
is a complicating factor (Habbershon, Williams, & MacMillan, 2003; Habbershon 
& Williams, 1999; Klein, Astrachan, & Smyrnios, 2005). Defining a family 
business is thus described as a main challenge to the family business field 
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(Handler, 1989; Klein, 2000; Mustakallio, Autio, & Zahra, 2002; Sharma, 2004; 
Wortman, 1994).1  
Today, there is still no commonly established definition within the scientific 
community (Astrachan et al., 2002; Ward & Dolan, 1998; Zahra & Sharma, 2004). 
According to Lank (1997, p. 154) "there are as many definitions for 'family 
enterprise' as there are researchers in the field". Habbershon and Williams (1999) 
state that the field has not been precise in its definition of a family firm, with more 
than 40 suggested definitions in the 1990s. Similarly, Zahra and Sharma (2004) 
state that the family business field still lacks coherence and discipline regarding the 
use of definitional operationalizations. Astrachan et al. (2002) conclude that "there 
is no clear demarcation between family and non-family businesses." In addition, 
"[…] artificially dichotomizing family vs. non-family firms […] creates more 
problems than it attempts to solve" (p. 46). This view is supported by Tsang 
(2002), who argues that companies should be placed on a continuum (cp. also 
Chrisman, Chua, & Zahra, 2003).  
While circle models (Gersick, Lansberg, Desjardins, & Dunn, 1999; Sharma, 
2003a; Tagiuri & Davis, 1996) and distinct behaviour of family firms (Chua, 
Chrisman, & Sharma, 1999) have received scholarly attention, the family's 
influence on the business has emerged as main differentiating characteristic 
between family firms and non-family firms (Astrachan et al., 2002; Habbershon et 
al., 2003; Habbershon & Williams, 1999). In recent years, two instruments 
measuring the family's influence have emerged, namely SFI (Klein, 2000) and F-
PEC (Astrachan et al., 2002). SFI (Substantial Family Influence) captures the 
family's influence regarding its involvement in ownership, management, and 
governance on a continuous scale (Klein, 2000). A company has to be influenced 
by a family in a substantial way in order to be classified as a family firm. Family 
influence is regarded as substantial "if the family either owns the complete stock or, 
                                                           
1
  It has to be noted that the meaning of the term "family" itself may differ across cultural contexts 
(cp. Klein 2000). However, this discussion is not deepened, as it is not central to this 
Dissertation.  
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if not, the lack of influence on ownership is balanced through either influence 
through corporate governance (percentage of seats in the board/family board held 
by family members) or influence through management (percentage of family 
members in the top management team)" (Klein, 2000, p. 158). This leads to a 
mathematical formula, whereas family businesses' SFI is equal or larger than 1 (cp. 
Klein, 2000). The SFI has been used in numerous quantitative studies (Frey, 
Halter, Klein, & Zellweger, 2004; Klein, 2000).  
The F-PEC consists of the subcategories power, experience, and culture 
(Astrachan et al., 2002) through which the family can influence the business. The 
power subscale refers to power in terms of ownership and involvement in 
management and governance. The experience dimension refers to the family's 
generational involvement and related experiences with regard to succession, as 
well as to the number of contributing family members. The culture subscale 
touches upon the overlap of family and business values as well as the family’s 
commitment to the business. The F-PEC is a move towards a multidimensional 
construct with continuous measures. A respective measurement instrument has 
been validated by Klein et al. (2005).  
In the Successful Transgenerational Entrepreneurship Practices (STEP) project, 
which investigates long-lived family firms on a global level, the criteria for firms 
to be included in the project are: self-perception as a family business; at least one 
active operating business; majority family ownership in the main operating 
business; at least second generation involved in management; at least 50 
employees in the main operating business; and an ambition to pass on the business 
to the next generation (Nordqvist & Zellweger, 2010).  
In the three papers of this cumulative Dissertation, the applied family business 
definitions are based on the abovementioned approaches. The first paper about EO 
in family firms is based on case studies that have been developed as part of the 
STEP project. Thus, it uses the definition applied there (cp. Nordqvist & 
Zellweger, 2010). The second paper analyses middle-level managers on a general 
level, without distinguishing between family and non-family firms. In the third 
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paper, the criteria for being classified as a family firm are at least one family 
member in an operational position; majority of equity ownership of the family; and 
the employees' perception that it is a family business (cp. Astrachan et al., 2002; 
Klein, 2000; Klein et al., 2005).  
 
1.3 Economic and academic relevance of family firms 
Family firms are of crucial importance to modern economies. They provide the 
majority of jobs, contribute significantly to a nation's GDP, and represent the 
dominating organizational form (cp. Astrachan & Shanker, 2003; Frey et al., 2004; 
Heck & Stafford, 2001; Klein, 2000; Morck & Yeung, 2003). In Switzerland, 
88.43% of all companies can be classified as family firms (Frey et al., 2004). 
Sharma (2004) confirms that a dominance of family businesses can be observed in 
most economies, both in terms of numbers and economic importance.  
Despite these facts, research on family firms has only existed since the mid 
1970s (Wortman, 1994). With only sporadic publications before 1975, the field has 
grown significantly since then (Jaskiewicz, 2006; Sharma, 2004; Zahra & Sharma, 
2004). Zahra and Sharma claim that family business research has "flourished" in 
recent years (p. 331). There has been a significant increase in the number of 
published articles, publication outlets, schools offering family business programs, 
and financial support for research (cp. Sharma, 2004). In addition, Zahra and 
Sharma (2004, p. 331) state that "there is a growing awareness among public 
policymakers of family firms' role in creating new jobs, incubating new businesses, 
and promoting economic development of local communities". The dominant topics 
in family business research still seem to be succession, family business 
performance, and governance issues (cp. Zahra & Sharma, 2004).  
Despite this positive development, however, family business research still 
struggles with emancipation and acceptance as a distinct research field (Lumpkin, 
7 
Martin, & Vaughn, 2008). Scholars argue that family business research heavily 
borrows from other fields such as psychology, sociology, economics, and law 
(Bird, Welsch, Astrachan, & Pistrui, 2002; Sharma, 2004; Wortman, 1994). An 
example is the resource-based view (RBV) from the field of strategic management 
(Barney, 1991; Wernerfelt, 1984). It is used to substantiate the distinctiveness of 
family firms by arguing that the interaction between the family and the business 
system generates unique capabilities and resources, which has been labeled 
familiness (Habbershon et al., 2003; Habbershon & Williams, 1999). Another 
example is agency theory, which has long been a dominant paradigm in 
organization and management theory (Daily, Dalton, & Rajagopalan, 2003; 
Eisenhardt, 1989a; Jensen & Meckling, 1976). In the family firm context, it has 
been applied to investigate the design of agency contracts (Cruz, Gomez-Mejia, & 
Becerra, 2010) and family business specific agency costs, which may occur for 
example due to altruism (Schulze, Lubatkin, & Dino, 2003b; Schulze, Lubatkin, 
Dino, & Buchholtz, 2001). As a consequence, family business research is criticized 
for not sufficiently giving back to the disciplines where it borrowed from (Zahra & 
Sharma, 2004). Doing so, however, would aid the field to increase its legitimacy 
and importance in the broader academic arena (Elsbach, Sutton, & Whetten, 1999).  
 
1.4 Firm-level entrepreneurship and family firms' success 
The concept of entrepreneurship can be traced back to the seminal work of 
Schumpeter (1934), who linked enterprising activities with the creation of new 
streams of economic and social value. Put differently, entrepreneurship as the 
creation of new entrepreneurial actions such as innovation, new ventures, strategic 
renewal, and creative destruction, leads to social and economic performance within 
firms (Davidsson & Wiklund, 2001; Habbershon, Nordqvist, & Zellweger, 2010; 
Sharma & Chrisman, 1999). Entrepreneurship is thus not only important for the 
creation of new firms, but also for established firms to sustain their internal 
"capacity to renew a firm’s operations through innovation in order to create new 
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capabilities" (Habbershon et al., 2010, p. 1; Zahra, 2005). Research on 
entrepreneurship generally "involves the study of sources of opportunities, the 
processes of discovery, evaluation, and exploitation of opportunities" [as well as] 
"the set of individuals who discover, evaluate, and exploit them" (Shane & 
Venkataraman, 2000, p. 218).  
In the field of entrepreneurship, the concept of corporate entrepreneurship 
refers to entrepreneurial activities within established organizations. While 
numerous definitions can be found (Covin & Miles, 1999; Dess et al., 2003; Phan, 
Wright, Ucbasaran, & Tan, 2009), the definition of Sharma and Chrisman (1999) is 
widely accepted. They define corporate entrepreneurship as "the process whereby 
an individual or a group of individuals, in association with an existing 
organization, create a new organization or instigate renewal or innovation within 
that organization" (p. 18).  
Corporate entrepreneurship has been validated as an important antecedent to a 
company's short- and long-term performance (e.g., Dess et al., 2003; Zahra & 
Covin, 1995; Zahra, Hayton, & Salvato, 2004; Zahra, Neubaum, & Huse, 2000). 
Effective corporate entrepreneurship allows a firm to exploit its current 
competitive advantage and to explore future opportunities and required 
competencies (Covin & Miles, 1999; Kuratko, Ireland et al., 2005; Schendel & 
Hitt, 2007). More specifically, corporate entrepreneurship has been linked to a 
firms' financial and market performance (Zahra, 1996), and to the (family) firms' 
survival, profitability, and growth (Lumpkin & Dess, 1996; Rogoff & Heck, 2003; 
Salvato, 2004). 
With regard to family firms, scholars partly disagree if that context is 
enhancing or impeding entrepreneurial activities. On the positive side, 
characteristics often attributed to family firms such as stewardship behavior 
(Eddleston & Kellermanns, 2006), family-to-firm-unity (Eddleston, Kellermanns, 
& Zellweger, 2008), or long-term horizons (Zellweger, 2007) may facilitate 
corporate entrepreneurship. On the negative side, long-term planning horizons 
9 
(Barringer & Bluedorn, 1999) and long-term tenure of main actors (Covin, 1991; 
Covin & Slevin, 1991) may lead to inertia and lower levels of entrepreneurial 
activities. Family firms are also assumed to suffer from risk averseness and 
strategic simplicity (Allio, 2004; Cabrera-Suarez, De Saa-Perez, & Garcia-
Almeida, 2001; Miller, 1983; Shepherd & Zahra, 2003). In addition, family firms 
have an inherent need for stability, which may oppose the need for change 
(Schulze, Lubatkin, & Dino, 2003a).  
While corporate entrepreneurship can be regarded as an umbrella term for 
different aspects, levels, and stages of activities and processes through which 
established organizations act entrepreneurially (Habbershon et al., 2010), 
entrepreneurial orientation (EO) has been validated as a core concept of corporate 
entrepreneurship, also in the context of family firms (e.g., Martin & Lumpkin, 
2003; Nordqvist et al., 2008). It refers to the strategy making processes and styles 
of firms that engage in entrepreneurial activities (Lumpkin & Dess, 1996, 2001). 
As such, it captures entrepreneurial mindsets and attitudes within a company 
(Habbershon et al., 2010). Entrepreneurial organizations tend to engage in strategy 
making characterized by an active stance in pursuing opportunities, taking risks 
and innovation (Dess, Lumpkin, & Covin, 1997). Miller (1983, p. 771) views an 
entrepreneurial firm as "one that engages in product market innovation, undertakes 
somewhat risky ventures, and is first to come up with ‘proactive’ innovations, 
beating competitors to the punch". Consequently, risk-taking, innovativeness, and 
proactiveness have been established as core dimensions of EO (cp. Covin & 
Slevin, 1989; Covin & Slevin, 1991; Wiklund, 1998). Building on the works of 
Miller (1983) and Stevenson and Jarillo (1990), Lumpkin and Dess (1996) add 
autonomy and competitive aggressiveness as dimensions of EO. They define it as 
"the processes, practices, and decision-making activities that lead to new entry", 
whereas new entry is "the act of launching a new venture" (Lumpkin & Dess, 
1996, p. 136). However, EO is not limited to new ventures. Habbershon et al. 
(2010) define EO as a measure of mindsets and attitudes derived from actual 
entrepreneurial performance, which is measured as the sum of an organization's 
innovation, renewal, and venturing efforts (see also Dess & Lumpkin, 2005; Zahra, 
1995). Numerous studies have confirmed a positive relationship between EO and 
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company performance (cp. Rauch et al., 2009). The following table illustrates the 
five established basic dimensions of EO (cp. Lumpkin & Dess, 1996; Martin & 
Lumpkin, 2003; Nordqvist et al., 2008).  
Dimension Description 
Autonomy Ability of individuals and teams within organizations to 
act independently and autonomously, free from 
organizational constraints 
Innovativeness Tendency of the firm to engage in and support new ideas 
and experimentation to create new products,  services, 
and markets 
Risk-taking Willingness to make large and risky resource 
commitments with a substantial probability of failure 
Proactiveness Opportunity-seeking attitude to introduce new products 
and services ahead of competition 
Competitive aggressiveness Propensity to directly and intensely challenge 
competitors 
Table 1: The five basic dimensions of EO 
 
1.5 Individual-level antecedents to family firms' success  
While both corporate entrepreneurship and EO are firm-level constructs, they 
imply that employees within the firm enact entrepreneurial behavior at the group or 
individual level (Sharma & Chrisman, 1999). These individual-level actions can be 
subsumed under the term entrepreneurial behavior. It refers to all actions taken by 
firm members that relate to the discovery, evaluation, and exploitation of 
entrepreneurial opportunities (cp. Hornsby, Kuratko, Shepherd, & Bott, 2009; 
Pearce, Kramer, & Robbins, 1997; Shane & Venkataraman, 2000; Smith & Di 
Gregorio, 2002). In general terms, individual-level entrepreneurial behavior is 
conceptualized as the behavior through which corporate entrepreneurship is 
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actually practiced and enacted (Kuratko, Ireland, & Hornsby, 2004; Pearce et al., 
1997; Shane & Venkataraman, 2000; Smith & Di Gregorio, 2002). Put differently, 
it is regarded as core aspect of and antecedent for effective corporate 
entrepreneurship on the individual level (cp. Hornsby et al., 2002; Kuratko, Ireland 
et al., 2005). Entrepreneurial behavior of firm members is argued to be critical to 
both the creation of new ventures and renewal from within an organization (Smith 
& Di Gregorio, 2002). Scholars that investigate individual-level entrepreneurial 
behavior have mostly focused on middle-level managers (Hornsby, Kuratko, & 
Montagno, 1999; Hornsby et al., 2009; Kuratko, Ireland et al., 2005). This is due to 
the claim that this class of management is most involved in innovative and 
entrepreneurial activities in established companies (Morris & Kuratko, 2002).  
Entrepreneurial behavior comprises implementing one’s own entrepreneurial 
actions, creating an entrepreneurial atmosphere, and motivating subordinates (cp. 
Floyd & Wooldridge, 1992; Ghoshal & Bartlett, 1994; Kuratko, 2010). 
Summarizing decades of research, Kuratko (2010) states that entrepreneurial 
behavior of middle-level managers "manifests itself both in terms of the need for 
middle-level managers to behave entrepreneurially themselves and the requirement 
for them to support and nurture others’ attempts to do the same" (p. 143). 
In line with the conceptualization of individual-level entrepreneurial behavior 
as a key antecedent to corporate entrepreneurship and ultimately firm performance, 
family business scholars agree that fostering non-family employees' value-creating 
attitudes and behaviors is essential to family firms' success and survival (Barnett & 
Kellermanns, 2006; Chrisman, Chua, & Litz, 2003; Chua, Chrisman, & Sharma, 
2003). The two most commonly investigated employee work attitudes that are 
conducive to company performance are affective commitment (cp. Allen & Meyer, 
1990; Meyer et al., 2002; Van Dyne & Pierce, 2004) and job satisfaction (e.g., 
Colquitt et al., 2001; Janssen & Van Yperen, 2004; Judge et al., 2001), whereas 
perceptions of organizational justice have been established as their key antecedents 
(Colquitt et al., 2001). 
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2 Overview of academic papers 
2.1 Addressed research gaps 
With regard to EO as the first main pillar of family firms' long-term success, a 
puzzle can be observed. While entrepreneurship scholars suggest a positive 
relationship between EO and firms' short-term and long-term success (Dess et al., 
2003; Zahra & Covin, 1995; Zahra & Garvis, 2000), numerous scholars who 
investigated family firms that have survived and prospered across generations 
argue that they provide a context hampering EO (Barringer & Bluedorn, 1999; 
Cabrera-Suarez et al., 2001; Covin & Slevin, 1991). Put differently, family firms 
seem to be successful over a long time despite rather low levels of EO. This 
opposes traditional entrepreneurship and EO wisdom (Lumpkin & Dess, 1996; 
Rauch et al., 2009). The question thus is: how much entrepreneurship in terms of 
EO is needed for long-term success of family firms? Do they have to be 
entrepreneurial all the time, or is there a distinct promising EO pattern? This 
research gap is addressed by the first paper by investigating three Swiss case 
studies of long-living family firms with EO as the theoretical lens.  
Second, while the importance of individual-level entrepreneurial behavior for 
effective corporate entrepreneurship and thus company success is well-established 
(Hornsby et al., 2002; Kuratko, Ireland et al., 2005), it is still not fully clear how 
this behavior actually evolves, especially in the context of middle-level managers. 
Scholars agree that middle-level managers' entrepreneurial behavior is enhanced by 
a combination of individual and organizational factors (Kuratko, 2010; Kuratko, 
Ireland et al., 2005; Naffziger, Hornsby, & Kuratko, 1994). However, research on 
personality traits and their relationship with entrepreneurial behavior has not been 
able to confirm a link (Holt, Rutherford, & Clohessy, 2007). This is regrettable, 
given the recent claim not to abandon elements of the person in entrepreneurship 
research (Hmieleski & Baron, 2009; Hmieleski & Corbett, 2008; Schjoedt & 
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Shaver, 2007). On the organizational level, three stable antecedents have been 
identified, namely management support, work discretion, and 
rewards/reinforcement (cp. Holt et al., 2007; Hornsby, Holt, & Kuratko, 2008; 
Hornsby et al., 2009; Kuratko, Hornsby, & Bishop, 2005). However, hardly any 
studies can be found that explicitly examine the interaction between individual-
level and organizational-level factors, even though this interaction is believed to be 
essential (cp. Kuratko, 2010; Kuratko, Ireland et al., 2005). These research gaps are 
addressed by the second paper. It introduces psychological ownership as 
individual-level antecedent to entrepreneurial behavior and examines its interaction 
with organizational antecedents. While entrepreneurial behavior of employees, 
such as middle-level managers, is of special interest in family firms (Barnett & 
Kellermanns, 2006; Chrisman, Chua, & Litz, 2003; Chua, Chrisman, & Sharma, 
2003), its relevance is not limited to the family firm context. To increase the 
generalizability of findings, the second paper thus investigates middle-level 
managers in both family and non-family firms.  
Third, while scholars agree that fostering positive work attitudes such as 
affective commitment and job satisfaction among non-family employees is a key 
antecedent to family firms' success (Barnett & Kellermanns, 2006; Chrisman, 
Chua, & Litz, 2003; Chua, Chrisman, & Sharma, 2003), unique challenges occur in 
family firms. This is due to the fact that justice perceptions of employees have 
been established as main factors that affect the evolvement of these attitudes. 
Unfortunately, family firms have been found to be especially prone to non-family 
employees' perceptions of injustice. Characteristics often attributed to family firms, 
such as paternalistic-autocratic rule, founder-centric cultures, lack of delegation, 
ingroup-outgroup perceptions of non-family employees, altruism, and nepotism 
constitute potential sources for injustice perceptions (cp. Barnett & Kellermanns, 
2006; Kelly, Athanassiou, & Crittenden, 2000; Padgett & Morris, 2005; Schein, 
1983; Schulze et al., 2001). Despite increasing scholarly attention, the amount of 
corresponding research is still insufficient (Carsrud, 2006). This is even more 
critical as it is not yet fully understood how exactly justice perceptions weave their 
way into favorable work attitudes (Choi & Chen, 2007; Judge & Colquitt, 2004). 
These gaps are addressed in the third paper by explicitly investigating non-family 
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employees' justice perceptions and how they actually lead to affective commitment 
and job satisfaction through psychological ownership.  
 
2.2 Methodologies 
The first paper is based on case study methodology. This is suggested when 
little is known about a phenomenon, current perspectives seem inadequate due to a 
lack of empirical substantiation or conflict with each other, or "when freshness in 
perspective to an already researched topic" is needed (Eisenhardt, 1989b, p. 548). 
Punch (2005) argues that case study research is suitable in situations where 
"knowledge is shallow, fragmentary, incomplete or non-existent" (p. 147). While 
research on EO in general can be regarded as mature, research on EO in the context 
of long-living family firms is disparate, and knowledge is fragmented. Thus, the 
state of research in that context can be classified as nascent, which advocates 
qualitative case study research (cp. Edmondson & McManus, 2007). Consequently, 
the first paper is based on three in-depth case studies that have been developed as 
part of the STEP project in Switzerland in 2006 and 2007. Detailed information 
about the three companies is reported in chapter 3.4. The four to five interviews per 
case were audio-taped and transcribed, and supplemented by different kinds of 
secondary materials to achieve triangulation. Afterwards, a detailed coding 
procedure was enacted, which led to three case study reports. As a next step, three 
researchers independently assessed the levels of the five EO dimensions for every 
company, whereas an inter-rater agreement of more than 90% was achieved. To 
increase the reliability of findings, a member check with the interview partners was 
conducted (cp. Denzin & Lincoln, 2000). For more details about the applied case 
study methodology it is referred to chapter 3.4.  
Papers 2 and 3 are based on the same quantitative dataset. Both research on 
entrepreneurial behavior of middle-level managers and on the connection between 
justice perceptions and attitudinal outcomes can be regarded as mature, which 
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advocates the use of quantitative data (cp. Edmondson & McManus, 2007). A 
comprehensive questionnaire has thus been developed in 2009. Later in 2009, valid 
email addresses of 10,750 management-level employees were randomly retrieved 
from the largest employee database for Switzerland and Germany. The online 
survey's response rate of 9.5% can be regarded as acceptable (Geletkanycz, 1998; 
Hambrick, Geletkanycz, & Fredrickson, 1993; Koch & McGrath, 1996; 
MacDougall & Robinson, 1990). Among others, the survey included measures for 
entrepreneurial behavior, psychological ownership, organizational antecedents to 
entrepreneurial behavior, organizational justice perceptions, affective commitment, 
and job satisfaction. Only measurement instruments were used that had been 
validated in renowned academic journals. For the two papers, numerous statistical 
tests have been conducted. Examples are non-response bias tests (Oppenheim, 
1966), common method bias tests, namely Harman's single factor test (Harman, 
1967) and confirmatory factor analyses (cp. Podsakoff, MacKenzie, Lee, & 
Podsakoff, 2003), and multicollinearity tests in terms of Variance Inflation Factor 
(VIF) and condition indices (cp. Cronbach, 1987; Hair, Black, Babin, Anderson, & 
Tatham, 2006). The results of all these tests mitigate non-response bias, common 
method bias, and multicollinearity concerns. In the second paper, the main effects 
and moderation effects of the proposed theoretical model are tested with multiple 
regression analyses. In the third paper, a mediation model is proposed. The 
corresponding effects are tested with multiple regressions following the procedure 
outlined in Baron and Kenny (1986). For further details about the data collection 
procedure and data analysis it is referred to chapters 4.5 and 5.5.  
 
2.3 Key characteristics of the three papers 
The three papers each address different research gaps, apply different 
theoretical constructs and methodologies, and offer unique contributions to 
research and practice. The following table gives an overview about their key 
characteristics, including authorship and publication status. 
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3 Entrepreneurial Orientation in Long-lived Family 
Firms 
Thomas Zellweger & Philipp Sieger  
 
3.1 Abstract 
We apply a key construct from the entrepreneurship field, entrepreneurial 
orientation (EO), in the context of long-lived family firms. Our qualitative in-depth 
case studies show that a permanently high level of the five EO dimensions is not a 
necessary condition for long-term success, as traditional entrepreneurship and EO 
literature implicitly suggest. Rather, we  claim that the level of EO is dynamically 
adapted over time and that the original EO scales (autonomy, innovativeness, risk 
taking, proactiveness, and competitive aggressiveness) do not sufficiently capture 
the full extent of entrepreneurial behaviors in long-lived family firms. Based on 
these considerations we suggest  extending the existing EO scales to provide a 
more fine-grained depiction of firm-level corporate entrepreneurship in long-lived 
family firms. 
 
3.2 Introduction 
A wide stream of corporate entrepreneurship literature proposes that 
entrepreneurial attitudes and behavior are crucial antecedents for a company's 
short- and long-term success (e.g., Dess et al., 2003; Zahra & Covin, 1995; Zahra 
et al., 2000). Effective corporate entrepreneurship allows a firm to exploit its 
current competitive advantage while also exploring future opportunities and 
required competencies (Covin & Miles, 1999; Kuratko, Ireland et al., 2005; 
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Schendel & Hitt, 2007). In an environment of rapid change and shortened product 
and business model life cycles, future profit streams from existing operations are 
uncertain, requiring businesses to constantly seek new opportunities. Therefore, 
firms may benefit from adopting corporate entrepreneurship (Rauch et al., 2009).  
Partly in contrast to these claims of the pivotal role of corporate 
entrepreneurship for organizational success, research on entrepreneurship in family 
firms that have survived and prospered for long periods of time is divided as to 
whether these organizations represent a context where entrepreneurship flourishes 
or is hampered (e.g., Naldi, Nordqvist, Sjöberg, & Wiklund, 2007). Scholars argue 
that the particular culture and power structure found in many family firms may 
considerably influence the extent to which entrepreneurial activities are 
encouraged or hindered (Hall, Melin, & Nordqvist, 2001; Salvato, 2004; Schein, 
1983; Zahra et al., 2004). Some propose that family firms present unique settings 
for entrepreneurship to flourish: for example, stewardship behavior (Eddleston & 
Kellermanns, 2006), family-to-firm-unity (Eddleston, Kellermanns, & Zellweger, 
2008), or long-term horizons (Zellweger, 2007). In contrast to this positive 
perspective, Barringer and Bluedorn (1999) suggest that reliance on long-term 
planning horizons runs counter to the proactive nature of the entrepreneurial 
process, and that a long-term tenure is optimal for conservative and less 
entrepreneurial firms (Covin, 1991; Covin & Slevin, 1991). Studies suggest that 
family firms are endangered by, for example, strategic simplicity and inertia 
(Cabrera-Suarez et al., 2001; Miller, 1983; Morris, 1998). Moreover, Schulze, 
Lubatkin and Dino (2003b) acknowledge the serious tensions that develop within 
the family firm between the need for change and stability, with entrepreneurship 
seen as an antidote to stability and strategic simplicity. 
The finding that many family firms have managed to survive and flourish over 
long periods of time despite low levels of corporate entrepreneurship challenges 
traditional entrepreneurship wisdom. In light of these considerations and different 
findings in the literature, we see a need for further reflection on corporate 
entrepreneurship in the context of long-lived family firms. We specifically 
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examine entrepreneurial orientation (EO) and treat EO as a key construct of firm-
level corporate entrepreneurship (Lumpkin & Dess, 1996; Miller, 1983). We 
analyze corporate entrepreneurship in long-lived family firms through three in-
depth case studies of Swiss firms, between 80 and 175 years old. To touch upon 
the uniqueness of entrepreneurship in family firms originating from the systemic 
interactions between the individual, the family, and the firm (Habbershon et al., 
2003), we interviewed thirteen top-echelon firm managers. Following precedent, 
we chose a qualitative methodology to encompass the different findings on 
corporate entrepreneurship in the family firm realm (Eisenhardt, 1989b). Using this 
methodology, we strive to overcome problems associated with the use of single-
respondent survey data in entrepreneurship research (Zahra, Jennings, & Kuratko, 
1999) and to address the general lack of attention to the lagged effect among the 
antecedents, performance outcomes, and different forms of corporate 
entrepreneurship (Dess et al., 2003). 
By investigating EO in the context of long-lived family firms, we make several 
important contributions to the entrepreneurship and family business literatures. We 
not only shed additional light on the question of whether corporate 
entrepreneurship is a necessary condition for long-term success, but also add to 
entrepreneurship literature by investigating the relationship between EO and 
performance (e.g., Rauch et al., 2009). Therefore, we build on and add to Zahra et 
al.'s (1999) reflection on equifinality, which suggests that organizations can utilize 
different orientations to reach the same objective and achieve the same outcome(s). 
Second, our analysis provides a more fine-grained perspective of EO in the context 
of family firms, which may help to explain the differing views in the literature 
about patterns of corporate entrepreneurship, such as about autonomy or risk taking 
(e.g., Nordqvist et al., 2008; Zahra, 2005). Because we reach beyond the existing 
dimensions of EO and propose additional scales that have not been incorporated 
thus far, we follow the continuous calls of researchers to apply established 
concepts from the entrepreneurship field in the family business context in order to 
advance both fields (e.g., Chrisman, Chua, & Sharma, 2005; Chua, Chrisman, & 
Steier, 2003; Hoy & Verser, 1994).  
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Our paper is structured as follows. First, we provide theoretical foundations by 
giving an overview of corporate entrepreneurship research in the context of family 
firms. Second, we illustrate our case research methodology and describe the firms 
we examined. Third, we present our case study findings regarding the five EO 
dimensions and, where appropriate, develop propositions as analytical 
generalizations. Finally, we discuss our insights, examine limitations, and provide 
directions for future research. 
 
3.3 Theoretical Foundations 
Corporate entrepreneurship is seen as critical to family firm success and 
survival across generations (Kellermanns & Eddleston, 2006; Rogoff & Heck, 
2003; Salvato, 2004). It refers to entrepreneurial activities within organizations that 
are designed to revitalize the company's business and to establish sustainable 
competitive advantages (cp. Kellermanns & Eddleston, 2006; Kuratko, Ireland et 
al., 2005; Zahra, 1995, 1996). However, literature is discordant about the firm-
level entrepreneurial tendencies of family firms. On one side, numerous 
researchers claim that family firms constitute an environment that is conducive to 
high levels of corporate entrepreneurship (Aldrich & Cliff, 2003; McCann, Leon-
Guerrero, & Haley Jr., 2001; Rogoff & Heck, 2003; Zahra et al., 2004). On the 
other side, scholars argue that family firms exhibit lower levels of entrepreneurial 
activities, as they are assumed to be risk averse (e.g., conservative and resistant to 
change and adaptation over time) (Allio, 2004; Poza, Alfred, & Maheshwari, 1997; 
Shepherd & Zahra, 2003; Whiteside & Brown, 1991). Recently, a number of 
articles has examined factors in family firms that affect corporate entrepreneurship, 
such as organizational culture (Habbershon & Pistrui, 2002; Hall et al., 2001; 
Zahra et al., 2004), generational involvement (Kellermanns & Eddleston, 2006), or 
stewardship characteristics (Eddleston, Kellermanns, & Zellweger, 2008; Miller, 
Le Breton-Miller, & Scholnick, 2008).  
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Also, a steadily growing stream of literature has investigated EO as a core 
concept of corporate entrepreneurship in the context of family firms (e.g., Martin 
& Lumpkin, 2003; Nordqvist et al., 2008). EO refers to the strategy making 
processes and styles of firms that engage in entrepreneurial activities (Lumpkin & 
Dess, 1996, 2001). Since our research explores EO and its dimensions of 
autonomy, innovativeness, risk taking, proactiveness, and competitive 
aggressiveness (Lumpkin & Dess, 1996), we deem it important to examine these 
dimensions and related research in the context of family businesses. 
Autonomy as captured in the EO construct refers to the "independent action of 
an individual or a team in bringing forth an idea or a vision and carrying it 
through to completion" (Lumpkin & Dess, 1996, p. 140); that is, the ability and 
will to be self-directed in the pursuit of opportunities. In an organizational context, 
it refers to actions taken free of stifling organizational constraints. Thus, even 
though factors such as resource availability, actions by competitive rivals, or 
internal organizational considerations may change the course of new-venture 
initiatives, these are not sufficient to extinguish the autonomous entrepreneurial 
processes that lead to new entry. Throughout the process, the organizational player 
remains free to act independently, to make key decisions, and to implement policy 
(Lumpkin & Dess, 1996). In the context of family firms, Martin and Lumpkin 
(2003) show that the autonomy of family members of successive generations 
decreases. Family management limits its own autonomy by involving more people 
in decision-making processes and installing strong boards of directors. In a similar 
way, Spinelli and Hunt (2000) claim that a paternalistic leadership style is replaced 
by a more participative style in later generations. Nordqvist et al. (2008) view 
autonomy as important regarding long-term entrepreneurial performance and 
suggest considering autonomy as having both an external (autonomy from 
stakeholders such as banks, suppliers, customers, and financial markets) and an 
internal (empowering individuals and teams within an organization) dimension. 
Hence, literature seems to propose that while autonomy may be seen as an 
important factor of corporate entrepreneurship, both internal and external 
autonomy need to be considered, whereas internal autonomy of family members of 
succeeding generations decreases. 
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Innovativeness refers to "a firm’s tendency to engage in and support new ideas, 
novelty, experimentation, and creative processes that may result in new products, 
services, or technological processes" (Lumpkin & Dess, 1996, p. 142). There is 
typically a continuum of innovativeness regarding both the scope and pace of 
innovation in products, markets, and technologies. Wealth is created when existing 
market structures are disrupted by introducing new goods or services, shifting 
resources away from existing firms and causing new firms to grow (Schumpeter, 
1942). The key to this cycle of activity is entrepreneurship: the competitive entry 
of innovative "new combinations" that propel the dynamic evolution of the 
economy (Schumpeter, 1934). In family firms, innovativeness is regarded as a 
highly important dimension of EO for long-term performance, together with 
autonomy and proactiveness (Nordqvist et al., 2008). McCann et al. (2001) find 
that younger and smaller family firms are more likely to be innovative than older, 
larger family firms. Furthermore, innovativeness is described as having greater 
potential for high performance, if it is driven by comprehensive strategic decision 
making and long-term orientation (Eddleston, Kellermanns, & Zellweger, 2008; 
McCann et al., 2001). 
Risk taking, in turn, refers to "the degree to which managers are willing to 
make large and risky resource commitments – i.e., those which have a reasonable 
chance of costly failures" (Miller & Friesen, 1978, p. 932). Recent research draws 
a more fine-grained picture about the risk taking propensity of family firms (e.g., 
Gomez-Mejia, Haynes, Nunez-Nickel, Jacobson, & Moyano-Fuentes, 2007; Morck 
& Yeung, 2003). Gomez-Mejia et al. (2007) find that family firms take decisions 
based on reference points. To protect socio-emotional wealth, family firms accept 
risk to their performance and, at the same time, avoid decisions that aggravate risk. 
Naldi et al. (2007) report that risk taking in family firms is positively associated 
with proactiveness and innovation and negatively with financial performance. 
Zahra (2005) finds that CEO-founder duality has no effect on risk taking, while 
long CEO tenure has a negative effect. Nordqvist et al. (2008) find that in family 
firms "there are less signs of risk-taking and competitive aggressiveness in 
comparison to proactiveness, innovativeness and autonomy" (p.108). Martin and 
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Lumpkin (2003) find partial support for their claim that family firms are more risk 
averse in later generations. Thus, literature on risk taking in family firms is divided 
on whether firms are risk-averse or risk-inclined organizations. Moreover, the 
validity of research is undermined by inconsistencies regarding the definition and 
measurement of risk taking. Martin and Lumpkin (2003) investigate risk in terms 
of investing personal assets and making loans to the business, tolerance of debt, 
and the importance of increasing profitability. Other authors investigate 
willingness to innovate (Benson, 1991), variation of performance outcomes 
(Gomez-Mejia et al., 2007), or debt levels (Mishra & McConaughy, 1999). In light 
of these inconsistencies in the literature, an assessment of family firms' risk 
aversion is problematic. 
Proactiveness refers to a firm's efforts to seize new opportunities. Lumpkin and 
Dess (2001, p. 431) define proactiveness as an "opportunity seeking, forward-
looking perspective involving introducing new products or services ahead of the 
competition and acting in anticipation of future demand to create change and 
shape the environment." It involves not only recognizing changes, but also being 
willing to act on those insights ahead of the competition (Dess & Lumpkin, 2005). 
Similarly, Stevenson and Jarillo (1990) conceptualize proactiveness as the 
organizational pursuit of favorable business opportunities. Proactive behavior can 
lead to first-mover advantages and higher economic profits (Lieberman & 
Montgomery, 1988). According to Kreiser, Marino and Weaver (2002), the 
dimension of proactiveness has received less attention from entrepreneurship 
researchers than, for example, the dimensions of innovativeness and risk taking. In 
the context of family firms, proactiveness is regarded as more important, together 
with autonomy and innovativeness (Nordqvist et al., 2008). These authors argue 
that when the historical path / new path, independence / dependence and 
informality / formality dualities are kept taut, family firms are freer  to act 
independently and proactively, thereby avoiding risk taking and competitive 
aggressiveness. Martin and Lumpkin (2003) find that proactiveness does not seem 
to be a consistent predictor of family firm success and they were not able to prove 
that proactiveness decreases  with later generations. In sum, the literature presents 
different findings regarding the relevance of this entrepreneurship dimension. 
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Finally, competitive aggressiveness refers to "a firm’s propensity to directly 
and intensely challenge its competitors to achieve entry or improve position, that 
is, to outperform industry rivals in the marketplace" (Lumpkin & Dess, 1996, p. 
148). Competitive aggressiveness can be reactive as well. For instance, a new entry 
that is an imitation of an existing product or service would be considered 
entrepreneurial if the move implies an aggressive, head-to-head confrontation in 
the market. According to Lumpkin and Dess (1996), competitive aggressiveness 
also embraces nontraditional methods of competition, such as new types of 
distribution or marketing. Martin and Lumpkin (2003) find that as later generations 
assume control and focus more on value and profitability than on directly 
challenging competitors to gain market share, the level of competitive 
aggressiveness decreases. In a qualitative study, Nordqvist et al. (2008) suggest 
that few of their interviewees choose to take a competitor head on (Lumpkin & 
Dess, 1996), instead competing with little consideration of competitors’ actions. 
This seems to suggest that an essential feature of entrepreneurial behavior, 
competitive aggressiveness, is of lower relevance in the context of family firms. 
In sum, research provides ambiguous findings as to whether the family firm 
context fosters or hampers corporate entrepreneurship. Also, scholars propose 
considering certain EO dimensions separately (e.g., internal and external 
autonomy; Nordqvist et al., 2008) to capture the full extent of entrepreneurial 
postures, thus questioning the applicability of the construct in the family firm 
context. Moreover, literature measures certain EO scales inconsistently (e.g., risk 
taking) (Zahra, 2005). In light of such concerns about levels and patterns of 
corporate entrepreneurship in long-lived family firms, we see a need to revisit the 
underlying assumptions of both corporate entrepreneurship and family business 
research as a first step toward a better understanding of corporate entrepreneurship 
in this context. Therefore, we follow Low and MacMillan's (1988) advice that the 
entrepreneurship field will be better served if the issue of theoretical perspective is 
addressed directly and if assumptions are made explicit. Considering the implicit 
assumption of entrepreneurship research we suggest that the entrepreneurship field 
has generally considered younger and often fast-growing firms, stressed the 
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dynamic context in which firms are embedded, and often focused on owner-
managed firms in the first generation, which have a short-term horizon (Gartner, 
1990; Zahra & Sharma, 2004). Success is often determined in terms of growth or 
financial performance and the harvesting of entrepreneurial opportunities. Despite 
the assertion that families may assist a firm’s start-up phase by investing personal 
assets (Aldrich, 1999; Chrisman, Chua, & Steier, 2002), the family aspect has been 
widely neglected in traditional entrepreneurship research. In contrast, we see 
family business research embedded mainly in the context of established, larger, 
and often multigenerational firms in mature industries, with long planning horizons 
and high emphasis on family aspects and relationships across all types of 
managerial activities (Hoy, 1992; Hoy & Verser, 1994). Success is often defined in 
broader terms, including nonfinancial performance or as the survival of the firm. 
As the focus is rather on family relationships, entrepreneurial behavior of firms is 
widely neglected. For a better illustration, these aspects of both entrepreneurship 
and family business literature are summarized in the next Table (based on  Hoy and 
Verser (1994); Hoy (1992); Gartner (1990); Brockhaus (1994); Sharma (2004); and 
Zahra and Sharma (2004)). It provides a prototypical overview of these two 
perspectives, each containing specific assumptions about the type of firm, industry, 
ownership, resource challenge, planning horizon, measures of performance, and 
corresponding research focus. 
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Entrepreneurship literature Family business literature 
Type of firm 
Young, newly created, often fast growing 
small and mid-sized firms 
 
Established, traditional, often 
multigenerational and larger firms 
Type of industry 
Growing and dynamic industries and markets 
 
Mature industries and saturated markets 
Type of ownership 
Owner-managed / 1st generation partnerships 
 
(Multigenerational) family ownership 
Resource challenge 
Adding resources to establish an organization 
in the competitive environment 
 
Reconfiguring and shedding resources to 
continue and readjust an organization in the 
competitive environment 
Planning horizon 
Short 
 
Long 
Measures of success and performance: 
Financial performance 
Taking advantage of opportunities in the 
market 
 
Survival and family succession 
Meeting a mixed goal set of financial and 
non-financial performance dimensions 
Main focus of research 
Entrepreneurial behavior (family relationships 
are widely neglected) 
 
Family relationships in a business context 
(entrepreneurial behavior is widely 
neglected) 
Table 3: Traditional perspectives of entrepreneurship / family business literature 
The inherent danger of this artificial dichotomization is that a certain behavior 
(e.g., entrepreneurial) is applied or misunderstood as the normative concept of the 
"right" behavior in any context. Through the theoretical lens of corporate 
entrepreneurship, a family firm navigating in a stable competitive context might be 
considered as nonentrepreneurial, thereby lacking a fundamental precondition for 
its long-term success. However, there are concerns in entrepreneurship literature 
about equifinality, which suggests that organizations can utilize different 
orientations to reach the same objective (Zahra et al., 1999). Jennings and Seaman 
(1994) propose that performance differences may not exist between entrepreneurial 
and conservative firms, making the implicit assumption that first-mover firms that 
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incur the highest risk and costs for innovative activities would always be rewarded 
for doing so (Zahra et al., 1999). Considering these reflections, we now describe 
our methodology through which we hope to gain additional insights into the levels 
and patterns of corporate entrepreneurship in long-lived family firms. 
 
3.4 Research design 
Our study relies on case study methodology. Eisenhardt (1989b) advocates case 
study research when little is known about a phenomenon, current perspectives 
seem inadequate due to a lack of empirical substantiation or conflict with each 
other, or "when freshness in perspective to an already researched topic" is needed 
(Eisenhardt, 1989b, p. 548). Punch (2005) states that case study research is suitable 
in situations where "knowledge is shallow, fragmentary, incomplete or non-
existent" (p.147). Based on the previous literature review and theoretical 
considerations, we regard the current status of research as disparate and knowledge 
as fragmented. Thus, we conclude that a case study approach is legitimate for the 
purpose of this study. Consequently, we investigate the five EO dimensions 
exploratively and, where appropriate, develop propositions ex post. This 
methodology is supported by Punch (2005) and Yin (1994), who state that one of 
the goals of explorative case studies is to develop pertinent hypotheses and 
propositions for further inquiry. 
The present paper is based on three in-depth qualitative case studies conducted 
in Switzerland in 2006 and 2007 as part of the STEP research project2. The 
companies are Health Pharma AG, Taste SA, and Technics AG. The next Table 
provides detailed information about the three cases as well as the selection criteria 
applied. Our case study approach corresponds to the guidelines of the STEP 
                                                           
2  STEP: Successful Transgenerational Entrepreneurship Practices is a worldwide research project, 
investigating entrepreneurship in the context of multi-generation family firms. See: 
www.stepproject.org 
28 
 
research project and has been applied in other studies investigating EO in a 
qualitative manner (e.g., Nordqvist et al., 2008). 
Company name Health Pharma AG Taste SA Technics AG 
Industry Pharmaceuticals Consumer goods Printing and Filtration 
Employees in 
2007 
340 175 2000 
Company Age  140 years 80 years 175 years 
Annual Sales 
2007 
60 million Euros 30 million Euros 200 million Euros 
Export orientation 5% of sales 30% of sales Subsidiaries in 21 countries, 
representations in 75 countries 
Ownership  100% family owned 
(2 branches, 
51%:49%) 
100% family 
owned by Taste 
brothers 
(51%:49%) 
Owned by 150 descendants of 
the nine founding families + a 
few managers (ca. 95% family 
ownership) 
Family 
involvement 
CEO and CFO, 
members of the 
supervisory board 
CEO, Director of 
Marketing 
CEO and members of the 
supervisory board 
No. of Interviews  5 4 4 
Position and 
status of 
interviewees 
CEO (family), CFO 
(family), Head of 
Marketing, Head of 
Production, 
President 
Supervisory Board 
CEO (family), 
Head of 
Marketing 
(family), Export 
Director, Chief of 
Production 
CEO (family), CFO, President 
Supervisory Board, Member 
Supervisory Board (family) 
Family 
Generation 
5th 3rd 7th 
Selection criteria: at least 2nd generation family ownership, ownership group of at least 2 
family members, 1 family member in management, majority of family control in at least 1 
of the controlled companies in the group which has to have more than 50 employees, self-
perception as a family business.  
Names changed for anonymity purposes. 
Table 4: Overview of selected cases of paper 1 
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The interview guideline, which was developed by a team of three researchers 
familiar with both EO and family business research, contains questions pertaining 
to all five EO dimensions. Additional descriptive statements or questions helped 
researchers choose the issues to be addressed (e.g., "how and why family influence 
and/or involvement impacts a firm's innovativeness"). In each company, two 
interviewers conducted four or five semi-structured interviews with both family 
and nonfamily members in top-echelon positions (e.g., CEO, CFO, Head of 
Marketing, etc.). Each interview lasted between 60 and 90 minutes. We asked the 
respondents to touch upon both EO at the firm-level and specific family 
involvement. We audiotaped all interviews and gathered secondary data from 
company websites, annual reports, press releases, and company documents to map 
out major strategic entrepreneurial actions, to describe important contingencies 
(industry, tax structure, or environment), to document relevant outcomes, and to 
accomplish "triangulation" (i.e., corroborate relevant information gathered through 
the interviews). 
The interviews were then transcribed and coded by a PhD student who, 
although not involved in the interviews, was familiar with both EO and family 
business literature and with case writing. We chose a third person for this part of 
our study to further increase the reliability of our findings and interpretations and 
to ensure divergent perspectives (Eisenhardt, 1989b). We did not use specific 
coding software because the number of interviews is limited and their length is not 
excessive. As the interviews were conducted on a semi-structured basis, we could 
rapidly identify and access defined constructs under consideration. The coding led 
to three case study protocols, each with a length of about 30 pages.3 These 
protocols were enriched with several tables, highlighting the family's and the firm's 
history and evolution, financials of the company, and an overview table of the five 
EO dimensions, including related statements of the interviewees. This helped us to 
become intimately familiar with each case and enabled  unique patterns  to emerge 
before cross-case comparison (Eisenhardt, 1989b). By integrating the information 
gained through the interviews with information gained through secondary 
                                                           
3
  These case study protocols are available on request from the authors.  
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materials, we measured EO using a combination of  firm behavior and managerial 
perceptions (Lyon, Lumpkin, & Dess, 2000). Following Yin (1998), the case study 
protocols were organized by the sequence of topics in the interviews. The case 
study protocols and the audiotapes were then sent to the two interviewers, who 
independently reviewed and adapted the protocols.  
Each of the three researchers independently assessed the levels of the five EO 
dimensions at the point of investigation for every company using a nine-point scale 
ranging from 1 (low) to 9 (high). To avoid overspecification, we formed three 
categories: low (rating 1-3), medium (rating 4-6), and high (rating 7-9). This 
resulted in a graphical illustration of all five EO dimensions for every company by 
each researcher (9 total EO profiles). The three researchers then met, discussed the 
case study protocols, and agreed on a final version that varied only marginally 
from the original version. After comparing identified EO patterns, we agreed upon 
one profile for each firm, reflecting our shared understanding. Of the 45 judgments 
of EO levels (3 researchers * 3 cases * 5 dimensions), we reached initial agreement 
in 42 out of 45 cases (>90%); the rare disagreements were resolved, since they 
referred to adjacent classifications. Consequently, we consider that inter-rater 
reliability was not a main concern in our study. In addition, researchers together 
considered possible shortcomings and extensions of the existing EO measures, 
resulting in a refined conceptual grid on EO in the context of  long-lived family 
firms (cp. Denzin & Lincoln, 2000). 
As a further test of the reliability of our findings, and in line with suggestions 
by Denzin and Lincoln (2000), we performed a member check by cross-checking 
our work with  managers' perceptions. The interviewees had the opportunity to 
read and comment on the case study protocols and our assessment of the EO 
patterns of their companies. This procedure not only is in accordance with Yin's 
(1994) recommendation about construct validity, but also increases the study's 
reliability. The interviewees had only minor comments, which were incorporated in 
our analysis. 
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3.5 Results 
In this section, we present our case-based findings regarding the five 
dimensions of EO. The following figures provide an overview of the levels and 
patterns of EO in our family firms.  
Taste SA Level of dimension 
Low Medium High 
E
O
 d
im
en
si
o
n
 
External autonomy    
Internal autonomy    
External innovativeness    
Internal innovativeness    
Ownership risk    
Performance hazard risk    
Control risk    
Proactiveness    
Competitive aggressiveness    
Figure 2: Refined EO profile of Taste SA 
 
Health AG Level of dimension 
Low Medium High 
E
O
 d
im
en
si
o
n
 
External autonomy    
Internal autonomy    
External innovativeness    
Internal innovativeness    
Ownership risk    
Performance hazard risk    
Control risk    
Proactiveness    
Competitive aggressiveness    
Figure 3: Refined EO profile of Health AG 
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Technics AG Level of dimension 
Low Medium High 
E
O
 d
im
en
si
o
n
 
External autonomy    
Internal autonomy    
External innovativeness    
Internal innovativeness    
Ownership risk    
Performance hazard risk    
Control risk    
Proactiveness    
Competitive aggressiveness    
Figure 4: Refined EO profile of Technics AG 
3.5.1 Autonomy 
As outlined previously, there are arguments that in the context of family firms 
the autonomy of successive generations decreases (Martin & Lumpkin, 2003). 
Nordqvist et al. (2008) suggest considering autonomy as having both an external 
and an internal dimension.  External autonomy refers to  independence from 
stakeholders such as banks, suppliers, customers, and financial markets. Internal 
autonomy is related to empowering individuals and teams within an organization. 
Nordqvist et al. (2008) suggest that, over time, family firms may increase internal 
autonomy of their employees. 
We find a clear differentiation between internal and external autonomy. Our 
family and nonfamily interviewees agree on the importance of internal autonomy, 
understood as empowering individuals and teams, as a driver of entrepreneurial 
activity.  In-depth interviews reveal that the third Taste generation and the fifth 
Health generation successfully managed to overcome the more patriarchal and 
authoritarian leadership style of their parents (fathers). The nonfamily managers of 
Taste SA  feel that open communication in the management team and the new 
management and leadership style are positive developments. Internal autonomy at 
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the workplace is therefore a more recent management practice, which is adopted by 
later generations and is represented by the presence of more nonfamily managers. 
However, more emphasis has always been, and is still, placed on external 
autonomy, meaning independence from external stakeholders. The first and 
foremost goal of all examined companies is to secure their independence in terms 
of external autonomy. According to Jean Taste, shareholder and marketing director 
of Taste SA: "One of our main goals is not to endanger the firm's independence 
and family control." As Regula Blinkli, nonfamily marketing director of Health 
AG, points out: "The wish for autonomy on the company level has always been a 
major driving force in the development of the company." Similarly, Karl Melber, 
nonfamily CFO of Technics AG, stresses that: "Independence from external parties 
has always been very important."  
Our interviewees also suggest that external autonomy on the firm level may 
provide owners and managers with the freedom to implement a unique strategy that 
does not have to satisfy short-term-oriented shareholder demands, hence increasing 
internal autonomy. A few years ago, the 150 family shareholders of Technics AG 
chose not to open its shareholder structure to the public for external and internal 
autonomy reasons. Managers of Technics AG consider external autonomy of the 
organization as a means to create internal autonomy of managers, thus generating 
further entrepreneurial development.  
Accordingly, our scoring of EO levels shows high levels of external and 
medium levels of internal autonomy across all firms (refer to Figure 1). We thus 
support the notion of Martin and Lumpkin (2003) and Nordqvist et al. (2008) that 
internal autonomy increases as later generations assume control of the business and 
shift to a more participative leadership style. In agreement with Nordqvist et al. 
(2008), we also find a clear distinction between external and internal autonomy, 
whereas external autonomy remains highly relevant over time across all firms. 
Accordingly, we propose that internal autonomy, at least retrospectively, cannot 
serve as an explanation for the continuing success of these firms. The constant 
presence of external autonomy better explains this success. In sum, we offer the 
following proposition: 
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Proposition 1: Long-lived family firms display constantly high levels of 
external autonomy across time, whereas internal autonomy increases as 
later family generations join the firm.  
3.5.2 Innovativeness 
Innovativeness is regarded as a highly important dimension of EO for the long-
term performance of family firms (Eddleston, Kellermanns, & Sarathy, 2008). 
McCann et al. (2001) find that younger and smaller firms are more likely to be 
innovative than older and larger  firms. Furthermore, innovativeness is described as 
leading to greater potential for high performance, as it is driven by comprehensive 
strategic decision making and long-term orientation (Eddleston, Kellermanns, & 
Zellweger, 2008; McCann et al., 2001). Specific patterns of innovativeness seem to 
exist. According to Frank Taste, the CEO of Taste SA, "Innovativeness is truly 
important since the introduction of our top-selling chocolate bar in the 1940s was 
a true innovation. But customers are slow in accepting new products and often 
show a high preference for a product they had known for years. Consequently, the 
introduction of new products and the entrance to new markets has been rather 
slow. Still, the company earns the largest part of its sales volume with the 
chocolate bar."  
Similarly, Technics AG did not constantly display high levels of innovativeness 
over its nearly 180 years of existence. Revolutionary phases, sometimes with 
intervals of up to three decades, were interspersed with evolutionary and 
incremental innovation phases. As the family CEO of Technics AG, a company 
that is active in an industry with proven manufacturing standards, states: "Big 
innovations come in waves and always have to be digested." Health AG managed 
to generate sales of roughly 60 million euro in a highly regulated niche market with 
little innovation in new products or development of new markets. According to the 
family CEO, Mrs. Julia Health, the firm is "not very innovation-driven when we 
look at new products, production processes, or technology." Innovativeness is 
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restricted by family heritage to a certain extent (e.g., products carrying the name of 
the former family CEO). Change occurs slowly and over time. When Regula 
Blinkli, nonfamily Head of Marketing, asks "why is this so?", the answer often is: 
"This has always been like that, it comes from the former family CEO." 
Beyond fluctuating levels across time, we identify a distinct pattern of 
innovativeness  that is not captured by the traditional EO construct. We find high 
levels of innovativeness within these firms, in forms that are less visible from the 
outside and are not represented by "the new" in terms of products, services, or 
technological processes (i.e., external innovation). However, these firms have 
made improvements that are innovative and value-generating through renewal 
from within (i.e., internal innovation). As Health AG’s CEO mentions: "Innovation 
rather comes from the inside; for example, the introduction of new management 
systems and structures than from the product or production side." More 
specifically, in recent years the firms under investigation have concentrated on 
implementing new management techniques such as fostering internal improvement 
processes or financial management systems (Health AG),  introducing a balanced 
and effective governance structure that represents the owning families with a 
committed management board (Technics AG), or implementing an umbrella brand 
strategy (Taste SA). This focus on internal innovativeness could be explained by 
the discretionary scope of action for the owner-managers of these firms. Due to 
higher degrees of internal freedom and lower degrees of freedom in an industrial 
context dominated by large multinationals, internal changes were more easily 
conceivable than changes that immediately affect the marketplace. The 
researchers’ independent scoring  of  internal and external innovativeness reveals 
medium to low levels of external innovativeness  (new products, markets, and 
technological processes)  and  medium to high levels of internal innovativeness 
(new managerial processes, structures, and management systems) (refer to Figure 
1). 
By connecting the two insights on fluctuating levels of innovativeness across 
time and the differentiation between internal and external dimensions, we find that 
the family-dominated life cycle of management and ownership structure has an 
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impact on the variation of both types of innovativeness. Within Taste SA and 
Health AG, we find high degrees of internal innovativeness during the first years 
after the transfer of control from one family generation to the next. After having 
assumed control from their father, the Taste brothers first built a management team 
and redefined leadership structures, thereby focusing on internal innovativeness. 
Once these changes were in place, their focus shifted to external innovativeness in 
terms of launching new products. Similarly, the family managers of Health AG 
implemented a management information system to monitor the actual financial 
performance of the firm before focusing on external innovativeness. In both cases, 
the preceding generations’ management style was highly personalized. Therefore, 
the later generation assuming control first had to resolve issues surrounding 
internal reorganization and innovativeness of decision making, leadership team, 
and style. Only after these challenges had been met could external product and 
market innovations be considered. 
Thus, we add two key insights to the innovativeness dimension within EO in 
the context of long-lived family firms. First, to capture the full extent of 
entrepreneurial behavior, innovativeness should differentiate between an external 
and an internal perspective. Second, the level of both external and internal 
innovativeness varies continuously over time and is strongly affected by 
generational changes. Accordingly, we develop the following propositions: 
Proposition 2a: The level of external innovativeness (new markets, 
products, and technological services) and internal innovativeness (new 
processes, structures, and management systems) in long-lived family firms 
fluctuates across time.  
Proposition 2b: Generational changes positively impact both forms of 
innovativeness. 
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3.5.3 Risk taking 
As outlined in our theory section, ambiguous findings about levels of risk 
taking in family firms may be related to an inconsistent use of definitions and 
measures  (for an overview refer to e.g., Gomez-Mejia et al., 2007; Morck & 
Yeung, 2003). Martin and Lumpkin (2003) investigate risk in terms of investing 
personal assets and making loans to the business, tolerance of debt, and the 
importance of increasing profitability. Other authors investigate willingness to 
innovate (Benson, 1991), variation of performance outcomes (Gomez-Mejia et al., 
2007), or debt levels (leverage) as a measure of control risk (Mishra & 
McConaughy, 1999). Drawing on this confusion, Zahra (2005) claims that a 
broader definition of risk taking is needed, as it is a complex construct with 
presumably multiple dimensions. 
Our findings shed further light on the intriguing issue of risk taking in family 
firms. Prima facie, our family firms are risk averse when measured in terms of 
leverage. The average share of equity from total assets is 75% in our firms. Across 
generations, all firms have been very "cautious with debt capital," according to the 
family CFO of Health AG. To avoid the risk of losing control over the company 
(control risk), they financed investments with their own cash flow (Mishra & 
McConaughy, 1999).  
Furthermore, the level of performance hazard risk, defined as the risk of 
organizational failure induced by business decisions, is low. This type of risk is 
measured through the probability of organizational failure or threats to survival 
(Hoskisson, Hitt, & Hill, 1991). We find that our family firms did take what Frank 
Taste labeled "calculated business risks"; that is, balancing the performance hazard 
risks associated with management decisions against existing solutions so that a 
project’s failure would not threaten the firm’s survival. As the president of the 
supervisory board of Technics AG states: "We will only engage in projects that do 
not endanger the company as a whole." In a similar way, the family CFO of Health 
AG claims that making a major step forward is difficult, "as only small risk are 
taken and only low levels of debt capital accepted." A member of Heath’s 
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supervisory board states that "it is better to muddle through with an existing 
concept without making large resource commitments. Being active in niches with 
amortized machinery is typical for companies like ours." 
In all cases, the family's background has a negative impact on taking decisions 
that could increase performance hazard risk. This may be understood in light of 
increased ownership risk, understood as investing most of one's personal wealth in 
only one or a few assets with no or only limited diversification. All interviewed 
family owners had assumed a high ownership stake in the family firm. According 
to the CFO of Technics AG: "The family shareholders prefer a stable dividend. We 
need to assure the dividend flow at any time, since there are family members for 
which the investment in our firm represents the largest part of their wealth and 
their pension fund." Accordingly, our cases reveal a nuanced pattern of risk taking 
once we differentiate between control risk (measured as leverage levels), 
performance hazard risk (measured as probability of organizational failure), and 
ownership risk (measured as owners holding undiversified assets). The researchers’ 
independent scoring reveals that all firms displayed higher levels of ownership risk 
and lower levels of both performance hazard and control risk (refer to Figure 1). 
Thus:  
Proposition 3: Long-lived family firms display higher levels of ownership 
risk and lower levels of both performance hazard and control risk. 
3.5.4 Proactiveness 
Inconsistent findings exist in the literature about the relevance of proactiveness 
in the context of family firms. Nordqvist and colleages (2008) argue that when the 
historical path / new path, independence / dependence and informality / formality 
dualities are kept taut, family firms are more inclined to be proactive. In contrast, 
Martin and Lumpkin (2003) find that proactiveness does not seem to be a 
consistent predictor of family firm success. 
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In our case studies, long-lived family firms displayed low to moderate levels of 
proactiveness (refer to Figure 1). Specifically, we find that in contrast to the central 
role entrepreneurship literature assigns to proactiveness, the companies in our 
study follow an evolutionary rather than a proactive path. A member of the 
supervisory board of Health AG claims that: "You should rather postpone building 
facilities and work with fewer people, in particular if the outlooks are rather 
uncertain." Frank Taste admits that his company has lived off its two top-selling 
products "for a bit too long." However, along with the transition from the second to 
the third generation, a new entrepreneurial spirit has developed within the 
company. The two third generation Taste brothers and their team have successfully 
launched a new product line, increased export orientation, and introduced an 
umbrella brand strategy: the first proactive moves after a long period of a reactive 
competitive posture. The family CEO of Technics AG draws a comparable picture 
about proactiveness spaced across long intervals. "In 1910 our company was at the 
forefront of a technological revolution, and in 1947 we introduced another product 
line, way ahead of our competitors. Today we strive to be proactive by reducing 
ecological concerns related to the use of our products." 
Hence, the firms we examined cannot be considered consistently strong 
proactive organizations. Taste SA and Health AG, for instance, have moved from 
pure trading activities to installing their own production facilities, repeatedly 
increasing their capacities across time. However, in most cases these investments 
were not undertaken as first moves, but were the result of long-term market 
screening and observation of competitors' actions. Even though the current 
management teams of Taste SA, Health AG, and Technics AG seem to display a 
proactive mindset, it remains unclear to what extent non-operating family 
shareholders would support proactive investments associated with large and risky 
resource commitments. As the family CEO of Health AG points out, family 
members not involved in firm operations would most likely inhibit a proactive 
move (e.g., opening overseas production facilities). In a similar way, a family 
supervisory board member of Technics AG states: "As you know, our non-
operating shareholders are rather risk averse. They have what I would call a 
"pension fund mentality." And they have said no to a recent opportunity to acquire 
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a nano-technology company that would have allowed us to enter a market that 
could become relevant in our field." These cases suggest that family owners not 
involved in business operations hinder bold proactive moves. 
In sum, we contribute to research on proactiveness in family firms with two 
insights. First, our firms exhibit a dynamic pattern regarding the level of 
proactiveness over time. They show longer periods of rather low levels of 
proactiveness, interrupted by phases of carefully selected proactive moves. Most of 
these firms adopted a "wait and see" posture, waiting for the right moment to leap 
ahead of the competition. Second, given our findings on family shareholders not 
involved in firm operations, we suggest that family CEOs willing to be more 
proactive may be hindered by family ownership structure. More formally stated: 
Proposition 4a: Proactiveness in long-lived family firms fluctuates over 
time, with periods of low levels of proactiveness interspersed with 
carefully selected proactive moves. 
Proposition 4b: The stronger the influence of family shareholders not 
involved in the firm's operations, the lower the level of proactiveness in 
long-lived family firms. 
3.5.5 Competitive aggressiveness 
Family business research seems to indicate that competitive aggressiveness is 
of significantly lower relevance in the context of family firms (Martin & Lumpkin, 
2003; Nordqvist et al., 2008). Eddleston et al. (2008) suggest that comprehensive 
strategic decision making and long-term orientation can be seen as antecedents to 
competitive aggressiveness and innovativeness. 
Our case analysis reveals that all three firms under investigation display low 
levels of competitive aggressiveness (refer to Figure 1). For example, our 
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interviewees voice a strong desire to dominate a market niche, thereby avoiding 
head-to-head competition and striving to be a "hidden champion" (Simon, 1996); 
with hidden understood not in terms of invisibility due to smaller size but as a 
competitive posture that avoids direct confrontation. By following a nonaggressive 
posture, our firms preferred a "live and let live" and "let them do their things" 
posture. As Norbert Health, CFO of Health AG, points out: "Being aggressive 
would not fit our company at all. I prefer a differentiation of our company that is 
based on our basic values and on our tradition as a Swiss family business. We have 
to be cautious with our outside appearance; we have to avoid aggressiveness and 
pomposity. We prefer being small but nice – a pearl in the market. The aim is 
sustainable success and not short-term profit maximization." In a similar way, the 
family marketing director of Taste SA claims: "Recently, a competitor tried to 
increase his market share with a radical change of the product’s  packaging. 
However, the customers did not accept the fancy changes, since the product itself 
remained the same. The resulting damage for the brand and also the company is 
tremendous. Such aggressive marketing campaigns would never have happened in 
our company."  
We interpret these statements on lower competitive aggressiveness not only in  
light of the resource constraints these firms face in comparison to the industry 
giants they are competing with, but also as a concern for firm reputation. Family 
managers might be particularly hesitant to be seen as aggressive, since a negative 
corporate reputation for aggressive firm behavior might negatively affect the 
reputation of the family and the manager. This is due to identity overlaps between 
the firm, family, and individual and is reinforced by the inability to leave the 
family or to easily switch management structures (Dyer & Whetten, 2006; Martin 
& Lumpkin, 2003). Tying back to existing research, we partly support the findings 
of Martin and Lumpkin (2003) that competitive aggressiveness might be lower for 
later-generation family firms. However, we reach beyond their assertion that 
decreasing competitive aggressiveness across generations may be induced by 
increasing levels of family orientation. We propose a reputation based rationale for 
why competitive aggressiveness should be lower in long-lived family firms. 
Reputation strengthens over time and is dependent on governance and ownership 
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structures (Rindova & Fombrun, 1999). Our three companies have built strong 
reputations over decades whereby this reputation is supported by the stable 
governance and ownership and structures, and all family members are concerned 
that aggressive behavior might destroy that image, including negative effects on 
personal reputation due to overlapping identities (Dyer & Whetten, 2006). More 
formally stated:  
Proposition 5: Competitive aggressiveness of long-lived family firms 
decreases over time due to reputation concerns of the controlling family. 
 
3.6 Discussion and Implications 
We set out to investigate the concept of firm-level corporate entrepreneurship 
measured through the EO construct in the context of long-lived family firms, given 
the inconsistent results in the literature about how entrepreneurship should be 
understood in this specific context (Schulze et al., 2003b; Zahra et al., 2004). 
Through three in-depth case studies of family firms, each between 80 and 175 
years old, in which we interviewed 13 family and nonfamily managers, we touch 
upon the uniqueness of firm-level corporate entrepreneurship that arises from the 
systemic interaction of individual, family, and firm. With this case-based 
methodology, we strive to overcome problems associated with the use of single-
respondent survey data in entrepreneurship research (Zahra et al., 1999) and 
address the general lack of attention to lagged effects among the antecedents, 
performance outcomes, and different forms of corporate entrepreneurship (Dess et 
al., 2003). We thereby gain several theoretical insights into the manifestation of 
corporate entrepreneurship in this specific context.  
First, and in contrast to the prevailing view in the entrepreneurship field, 
interviews seem to indicate that our firms exhibit low, or at best medium, levels of 
the five salient EO dimensions. This partly contradicts the assumption that lower 
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levels of EO should endanger organizational survival and prosperity (e.g., Covin, 
Green, & Slevin, 2006; Dess et al., 2003; Wiklund, 2006; Wiklund & Shepherd, 
2005). Our research reveals that the key to generation-spanning success is not 
dependent on consistently reaching the maximum  degree of all EO dimensions. 
"More is better" does not always seem to be true. To achieve success across 
generations, continuous adaptation of the company's EO profile seems to be 
necessary. Accordingly, we claim that generational change has a strong impact on 
EO and we provide a dynamic perspective of EO in family firms. The observed 
contradiction to general EO wisdom might be related to the fact that the EO 
construct is inherently static, as it is developed and used to measure entrepreneurial 
behavior at a certain point in time. As such, we add to Zahra et al.'s (1999) 
reflection on equifinality, which suggests that organizations can utilize different 
orientations to reach the same objective. 
Second, we provide a more fine-grained and somewhat different perspective on 
several dimensions of EO. Regarding autonomy, we support Nordqvist et al.’s 
(2008) suggestion to distinguish between external and internal autonomy. More 
specifically, over time, we find increasing levels of internal autonomy and a 
consistently high level of external autonomy. Accordingly, we propose that internal 
autonomy, at least retrospectively, cannot serve as an explanation for the 
continuing success of these firms and that the constant presence of external 
autonomy better explains this success. As a consequence, we suggest that long-
lived family firms display consistently high levels of external autonomy, whereas 
internal autonomy increases when later family generations join the firm. 
Regarding innovativeness, we expand existing knowledge by finding that the 
corresponding scale of EO is not perfectly suitable to examine long-lived family 
firms. While our firms score low on the traditional innovativeness scale that 
measures new products, markets, and technological processes (Lumpkin & Dess, 
1996), the interviews revealed high levels of internal and "invisible" innovations 
such as exploiting existing solutions and the improvement of management systems 
and governance structures (i.e., internal process redesign). Although these internal 
innovations also contribute to success, they are not captured by the traditional 
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innovativeness scale of EO. As our interviewees point out, innovativeness 
fluctuates over time, since innovations must be absorbed and may not be 
immediately apparent. We add to the calls by researchers to consider the lagged 
effects of corporate entrepreneurship (Dess et al., 2003) and suggest that the family 
life cycle has a strong effect on innovativeness. We propose that generational 
changes can increase the level of internal and external innovativeness in family 
firms, which is in line with Hoy’s (2006) claim that the life-cycle stage of family 
members is a decisive factor regarding family firm entrepreneurial behavior, and 
especially innovativeness.  
As for risk taking, we propose that risk is multidimensional and suggest 
extending the risk taking dimension to overcome the fragmentary picture presented 
by the traditional measure (Naldi et al., 2007; Zahra, 2005). Specifically, we 
propose three different aspects of risk, leading to a more fine-grained 
understanding of this dimension. First, we identify high levels of ownership risk, 
resulting from increased levels of undiversified wealth tied to the family firm. 
Second, as a result of heightened ownership risk, we find a lower willingness to 
take risky business decisions, defined as performance hazard risk. Third, we reveal 
an aversion to high levels of control risk, measured in terms of leverage. Also, we 
cannot find support for the claim by Martin and Lumpkin (2003) that the level of 
risk, in whatever form, decreases as later generations join the firm. 
We also add new insights into the proactiveness dimension, with two major 
findings. First, our firms exhibit a dynamic pattern regarding the level of 
proactiveness over time, with longer periods of rather low levels of proactiveness 
interspersed with phases of carefully selected proactive moves. In most cases, these 
firms adopted a "wait and see" posture, waiting for the right moment to leap ahead 
of the competition. Second, given our findings on family shareholders not involved 
in firm operations, we suggest that the strong influence of non-operating family 
members can hinder the proactive moves of family CEOs. Our findings might help 
to reconcile the divergent insights in the literature on the relevance of 
proactiveness (e.g., Martin & Lumpkin, 2003; Nordqvist et al., 2008). 
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Regarding the competitive aggressiveness dimension, a main outcome of our 
research is that high levels of competitive aggressiveness do not seem to be a 
necessary precondition for generation-spanning success, despite the presumably 
pivotal role of competitive aggressiveness within EO (Lumpkin & Dess, 1996). 
While we partly support the argument of Martin and Lumpkin (2003) that 
competitive aggressiveness decreases in later generations, we suggest that this 
decrease may be due not only to increasing family orientation, as these authors 
state, but also to possible negative spillover effects on personal and family 
reputation. 
 
3.7 Limitations 
Our research is not without limitations. In our attempt to investigate 
entrepreneurship in the context of family firms, we follow a "common 
denominator" approach (Dyer & Handler, 1994; Hoy & Verser, 1994); that is, 
examining an element or characteristic held in common. We are aware  that this 
approach is limited in terms of its explicative power. If the goal is to study family 
businesses through the lens of entrepreneurship, as in our case, then that common 
denominator will define what actually can and will be studied. However, specific 
family-related aspects, such as family structures, succession plans, and family 
harmony, cannot be fully understood through the lens of corporate 
entrepreneurship or EO. A second possible limitation is the generalizability of our 
findings, a common criticism of case study research (Punch, 2005). However, we 
see our interpretations and the derived propositions as analytical rather than 
statistical generalizations derived through rigorous research. Additionally, as our 
cases all stem from the same cultural background (Switzerland), the applicability 
of our results to long-lived family firms from other cultures may be limited. 
Finally, as we extrapolate from our findings to the population of long-lived family 
firms, we need to address the issue of heterogeneity (e.g., Hall & Nordqvist, 2008; 
Sharma, 2003b). Given the selection of cases, our findings might be particularly 
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suited to explain entrepreneurial behavior in mid-sized and later-generation family 
firms. Our considerations might be of less relevance in the context of small and 
young family firms. 
 
3.8 Directions for future research 
We suggest several avenues for future research. One possibility is to test both 
our propositions and our challenging of the implicit assumption regarding EO that 
"more is better." This could be done with a cross-sectional study, investigating the 
stable subdimensions of EO (i.e. external autonomy, ownership risk and control 
risk) that we have identified in our case studies. For capturing the changing EO 
subdimensions over time, this study could be conducted at two points of time, for 
example before and after a younger generation has taken over the family business. 
Furthermore, we call for additional case study research for further substantiation of 
our findings. Both the survey(s) and the case studies could take place in different 
cultural and industrial contexts to further improve the generalizability of our 
results. There is an opportunity to explore what we might label "liability of 
oldness," as opposed to the "liability of newness" (Stinchcombe, 1965). Whereas 
young firms may act aggressively in general (due to newness), more established 
organizations might challenge their competitors purely to assure their own market 
presence, established reputation and survival (due to oldness). In addition, 
researchers could consider the question of how the EO profile of long-lived family 
firms can be transformed over time and which factors support or hinder such 
attempts. Entrepreneurship researchers might follow our suggestion to rethink the 
definitions of the autonomy, innovativeness, and risk taking dimensions according 
to the insights gained in the family business context, which could enrich research 
in other contexts. Additionally, conducting research in the context of long-
established nonfamily firms could lead to valuable insights regarding the extent to 
which our findings are applicable to non-family firms. 
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3.9 Conclusion 
Tying back to our research question, we examined the boundaries of the EO 
construct when applied in the context of long-lived family firms. Our cases show 
that these firms have been successful over time, even with moderate or low levels 
of overall corporate entrepreneurship. To fully capture the patterns of corporate 
entrepreneurship in family firms and to understand these firms’ continuing success, 
we propose several extensions to the existing EO dimensions. In such a refined EO 
profile, long-lived family firms seem to display a consistent pattern of 
entrepreneurship that partly challenges accepted wisdom. Thus, we hope to inspire 
future entrepreneurship and family business scholars with our findings and 
propositions. In this way, we could fulfill our goal of giving back to the field that 
has enriched our work.  
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4 Entrepreneurial Middle-level Managers: The Roles 
of Psychological Ownership and Organizational 
Factors 
Philipp Sieger 
 
4.1 Abstract 
Despite the importance of middle-level managers’ entrepreneurial behavior 
there is still a lack of knowledge about its determinants. Especially the role of 
individual-level factors and their interactions with organizational antecedents are 
unclear. Based on a sample of 403 middle-level managers this paper introduces 
psychological ownership as individual-level trigger for their entrepreneurial 
behavior. The analysis of combinations of psychological ownership and established 
organizational antecedents reveals that management support strengthens the 
psychological ownership - entrepreneurial behavior relationship, whereas no 
moderation effects are found for work discretion and rewards/reinforcement. These 
findings constitute valuable contributions to entrepreneurial behavior and 
psychological ownership literatures, as well as to practice.  
 
4.2 Introduction 
Middle-level managers' entrepreneurial behavior has been conceptualized as 
core aspect of and antecedent for effective corporate entrepreneurship (cp. Hornsby 
et al., 2002; Kuratko, Ireland et al., 2005). This behavior comprises implementing 
one’s own entrepreneurial actions, creating an entrepreneurial atmosphere, and 
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motivating subordinates (cp. Floyd & Wooldridge, 1992; Ghoshal & Bartlett, 
1994; Kuratko, 2010). Despite the crucial importance of middle-level managers' 
entrepreneurial behavior, and even though scholars have devoted significant efforts 
to investigate its determinants, there is still a lack of understanding of how it 
actually comes into being.  
Scholars agree that middle-level managers' entrepreneurial behavior is fostered 
by a combination of individual and organizational factors (Kuratko, 2010; Kuratko, 
Ireland et al., 2005; Naffziger et al., 1994). Existing research on corresponding 
individual-level antecedents has mainly focused on individual characteristics such 
as personality traits (Begley & Boyd, 1987; Gartner, 1989; Rauch & Frese, 2007). 
However, Holt, Rutherford and Clohessy (2007) were not able to confirm a 
relationship of the Big Five personality traits with employees' propensity to act 
entrepreneurially in an organizational setting. Given recent calls not to abandon 
elements of the person in entrepreneurship research (Hmieleski & Baron, 2009; 
Hmieleski & Corbett, 2008; Schjoedt & Shaver, 2007), further research on 
individual-level factors that influence middle-level managers' decision to act 
entrepreneurially is promising. 
On the organizational level, literature has converged to five main antecedents 
(cp. Hornsby et al., 2002; Kuratko, Ireland et al., 2005), whereas empirical studies 
offer stable and consistent support for three of them: management support, work 
discretion, and rewards/reinforcement (cp. Holt et al., 2007; Hornsby et al., 2008; 
Hornsby et al., 2009; Kuratko, Hornsby et al., 2005). So far, however, hardly any 
study has explicitly investigated the interaction between individual-level and 
organizational-level factors, which is necessary given its established importance 
(cp. Kuratko, 2010; Kuratko, Ireland et al., 2005).  
This paper addresses the illustrated research gaps in two ways. First, it 
introduces the concept of psychological ownership as an individual-level trigger 
for middle-level managers' entrepreneurial behavior. Psychological ownership has 
been defined as "the state in which individuals feel as though the target of 
ownership or a piece of that target is 'theirs' " (Pierce, Kostova, & Dirks, 2003: 86). 
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While psychological ownership of employees toward the firm they work for has 
been found to induce various pro-organizational behaviors, such as organizational 
citizenship behavior and affective commitment (cp. Avey, Avolio, Crossley, & 
Luthans, 2009; Van Dyne & Pierce, 2004), the link to entrepreneurial behavior has 
not been explored in detail yet. Second, to investigate the interaction between 
individual-level and organizational-level antecedents, this paper explores the 
moderation effects of management support, work discretion, and 
rewards/reinforcement, in the psychological ownership - entrepreneurial behavior 
relationship. The hypotheses are tested on a sample of 403 middle-level managers 
from companies based in Germany and German-speaking Switzerland.  
The contributions of this paper are manifold. First, the paper adds to the 
growing literature on middle-level managers’ entrepreneurial behavior. Speaking 
to scholars who investigate individual-level differences in the context of 
entrepreneurship (cp. Holt et al., 2007; Hornsby, Naffziger, Kuratko, & Montagno, 
1993; Rauch & Frese, 2007), the study introduces psychological ownership as an 
individual-level state of mind that differentiates non-entrepreneurial from 
entrepreneurial middle-level managers. Furthermore, the study sheds a nuanced 
light on the interaction between individual-level and organizational-level 
antecedents (cp. Kuratko, Ireland et al., 2005; Kuratko et al., 2004). The significant 
moderation effect of management support and the insignificant moderation effects 
of work discretion and rewards/reinforcement offer unique insights into how 
psychological ownership and organizational factors interact in fostering middle-
level managers' entrepreneurial behavior, which addresses entrepreneurial behavior 
scholars in general (e.g., Goodale, Kuratko, Hornsby, & Covin, 2010; Hornsby et 
al., 2009; Kuratko, Ireland et al., 2005). Second, the paper contributes to 
psychological ownership research, as it is the first to introduce psychological 
ownership in the context of middle-level managers' entrepreneurial behavior, 
which speaks to scholars who investigate behavioral consequences of 
psychological ownership (e.g., Avey et al., 2009; O’Driscoll, Pierce, & Coghlan, 
2006). Third, for business practitioners, this study illustrates new and promising 
ways of how middle-level managers' entrepreneurial behavior can be fostered in 
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practice, namely by a meaningful and strategic management of both individual-
level and organizational-level factors.  
The paper is structured as follows. First, I present the theoretical foundations of 
middle-level managers' entrepreneurial behavior and psychological ownership. 
Second, I derive the hypotheses, describe the sample and methods, and present the 
empirical findings. I then discuss results and contributions, limitations, and 
avenues for future research. The paper closes with a final conclusion.  
 
4.3 Theoretical foundations 
4.3.1 Entrepreneurial behavior of middle-level managers 
In general terms, entrepreneurial behavior captures all actions by firm members 
that relate to the discovery, evaluation, and exploitation of entrepreneurial 
opportunities (Shane & Venkataraman, 2000; Smith & Di Gregorio, 2002). It is 
thus the behavior through which corporate entrepreneurship is practiced (Hornsby 
et al., 2002; Kuratko, Ireland et al., 2005; Shane & Venkataraman, 2000; Smith & 
Di Gregorio, 2002). Corporate entrepreneurship is comprehensively understood as 
"the process whereby an individual or a group of individuals, in association with 
an existing organization, create a new organization or instigate renewal or 
innovation within that organization" (Sharma & Chrisman, 1999, p. 18). 
Entrepreneurial behavior of firm members is argued to be critical to both the 
creation of new ventures and renewal from within an organization (Smith & Di 
Gregorio, 2002).  
The major part of entrepreneurial behavior literature has focused on middle-
level managers (Hornsby et al., 1999; Hornsby et al., 2009; Hornsby et al., 2002; 
Kuratko, Ireland et al., 2005), whose roles and tasks differ from those of top-level 
52 
 
managers and operative-level managers. King, Fowler, and Zeithaml (2001) argue 
that middle-level managers reconcile top-level managers' perspectives with 
implementation issues that appear at lower management levels. Top-level 
managers are primarily concerned with strategic decisions, and operative-level 
managers implement the directives they receive from middle-level managers (cp. 
Floyd & Lane, 2000; Fulop, 1991).  
In the context of entrepreneurship, Ghoshal and Bartlett (1994) see middle-
level managers as enablers of individual entrepreneurial action by facilitating 
information flows from top to bottom, with a crucial role in creating an 
environment that encourages innovation and entrepreneurship (cp. Floyd & 
Wooldridge, 1992; Ginsberg & Hay, 1994). They are seen as stimulating interest in 
entrepreneurship, fostering the commitment of subordinate employees to related 
activities (Hornsby et al., 2002), and encouraging subordinates to take risks, to 
innovate, and to engage in autonomous entrepreneurial activities (cp. Hornsby et 
al., 2002; Kanter, 1985). Kuratko et al. (2005) conclude that middle-level managers 
"endorse, refine, and shepherd entrepreneurial opportunities and identify, acquire, 
and deploy resources needed to pursue those opportunities" (p. 705). Middle-level 
managers are described as the class of management that is most involved in 
innovative and entrepreneurial activities in established companies (Morris & 
Kuratko, 2002). Summarizing decades of research, Kuratko (2010) states that 
entrepreneurial behavior of middle-level managers "manifests itself both in terms 
of the need for middle-level managers to behave entrepreneurially themselves and 
the requirement for them to support and nurture others’ attempts to do the same" 
(p. 143). This two-dimensional nature is thus the key characteristic of middle-level 
managers' entrepreneurial behavior.  
Despite significant scholarly efforts the antecedents of middle-level managers' 
entrepreneurial behavior are still insufficiently understood. Numerous scholars 
agree that individual and organizational factors work together (see also Kuratko, 
2010; Naffziger et al., 1994). According to Kuratko et al. (2005), middle-level 
managers' entrepreneurial behavior depends on both conducive organizational 
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antecedents and their individual decisions to act. This view is supported by Baum, 
Locke and Smith (2001) who highlight the interaction of individual, organizational, 
and environmental domains. Similarly, Kuratko et al. (2004) propose that 
entrepreneurial behavior is a product of individual and organizational antecedents. 
Further supporting this argument, Goldsby, Kuratko, Hornsby, Houghton, and 
Neck (2006) state that people are certainly "influenced but not dominated by their 
environments", and "still have to make behavioral choices" (p. 24).  
Referring to the individual level, research on personal characteristics and traits 
has mainly tried to differentiate entrepreneurs from business managers and the 
general population, whereas business creation and ventures' success have mostly 
been used as dependent variables (Gartner, 1989; Rauch & Frese, 2007). In an 
organizational setting, however, Holt et al. (2007) were not able to validate the 
proposed effects of the Big Five model of personality (cp. Zhao & Siebert, 2006) 
on employees' propensity to act entrepreneurially.  
On the organizational level, research in the last decades has come to the 
conclusion that there are five main organizational antecedents of middle-level 
managers' entrepreneurial behavior, namely management support, work discretion, 
rewards/reinforcement, time availability, and organizational boundaries (cp. 
Hornsby et al., 1999; Hornsby et al., 2002; Kuratko, Ireland et al., 2005). All these 
factors affect the internal organizational context, which determines interest in and 
support of entrepreneurial initiatives (Burgelman, 1983; Hornsby et al., 2002). 
These antecedents not only have to exist, but also have to be perceived as such (cp. 
Hornsby et al., 2002). Middle-level managers interpret these antecedents as 
indications of an internal environment supporting entrepreneurial behavior, and 
actually exhibit this behavior if they perceive that its value exceeds the value of 
other behaviors (cp. Chen, Greene, & Crick, 1998). Building on previous research 
(Hornsby et al., 1999; Kuratko, Montagno, & Hornsby, 1990), Hornsby et al. 
(2002) developed the Corporate Entrepreneurship Assessment Instrument (CEAI) 
to measure middle-level managers' perceptions of these five factors. Numerous 
empirical studies applying this measure offer stable and consistent support for the 
dimensions of management support, work discretion, and rewards/reinforcement 
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(cp. Hornsby et al., 2008; Hornsby et al., 1999; Hornsby et al., 2009; Kuratko, 
Hornsby et al., 2005). However, in contrast to theoretical expectations, scholars 
sometimes report insignificant or even negative relationships with entrepreneurial 
behavior for the time availability dimension (Holt et al., 2007; Hornsby et al., 
2009), and the organizational boundaries dimension seems to suffer from 
measurement problems (cp. Holt et al., 2007; Hornsby et al., 2008; Hornsby et al., 
2009). Consequently, the present paper focuses on the stable dimensions of 
management support, work discretion, and rewards/reinforcement.  
Management support has been identified as a central organizational prerequisite 
for middle-level managers' entrepreneurial behavior (Kuratko, 2010; Kuratko, 
Ireland et al., 2005; MacMillan, Block, & Narasimha, 1986). It is understood as the 
extent to which one perceives that top-level managers are willing to facilitate and 
promote entrepreneurial activities in the firm (cp. Kuratko, Hornsby, Naffziger, & 
Montagno, 1993; Pearce et al., 1997; Stevenson & Jarillo, 1990). This perceived 
top-management support can occur by championing new ideas, providing 
resources, or institutionalizing entrepreneurial activity.  
Work discretion refers to the extent to which one perceives that senior 
managers are committed to tolerate failure, to delegate authority and responsibility 
to lower-level managers, to provide decision-making latitude, and avoid excessive 
oversight (cp. Burgelman, 1983; Hornsby et al., 2009; Kuratko, Ireland et al., 
2005; MacMillan et al., 1986). This, in turn, increases middle-level managers' 
ability or willingness to take risks in the pursuit of innovation (Kuratko et al., 
2004). Work discretion in that sense may be used for entrepreneurial 
experimentation by middle-level managers (Kuratko, Ireland, & Hornsby, 2001).  
Finally, rewards/reinforcement refers to the extent to which employees perceive 
that the organization uses reward systems that are based on performance and 
highlight significant achievements (Kuratko, 2010). These systems should honor 
entrepreneurial activity and success, which elicits and supports entrepreneurial 
actions (Hornsby et al., 2002; Kuratko, Hornsby et al., 2005). Scholars argue that 
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such systems should consider goals, feedback, individual responsibility, and result-
based incentives, and also encourage pursuit of challenging work (cp. Block & 
Ornati, 1987; Kanter, 1985; Kuratko, Ireland et al., 2005; Sathe, 1985). 
Appropriate rewards such as increased responsibilities or special recognition can 
also increase middle-level managers' willingness to assume risks associated with 
entrepreneurial actions (Kuratko, Ireland et al., 2005).  
The abovementioned interaction of individual-level and organizational-level 
antecedents, however, has not been addressed explicitly by existing research (cp. 
Hornsby et al., 1999; Hornsby et al., 2009; Kuratko, Hornsby et al., 2005). This 
would be promising, as "research is needed to further clarify the linkage between 
the presence of specific qualities and properties in an organizational context and 
individuals' (such as middle-level managers) decisions to act entrepreneurially" 
(Kuratko, Ireland et al., 2005, p. 711).  
Thus, there is a need for research on individual-level antecedents that foster 
middle-level managers' entrepreneurial behavior and on their interaction with 
organizational factors. This paper addresses these gaps by introducing 
psychological ownership as an individual-level state of mind that triggers middle-
level managers to act entrepreneurially and by investigating the moderation effects 
of three organizational factors.  
4.3.2 Psychological Ownership 
In recent years, the concept of psychological ownership has received 
considerable scholarly attention when investigating the relationship between the 
employee and the organization (cp. Avey et al., 2009; Pierce et al., 2003; Pierce, 
O'Driscoll, & Coghlan, 2004; Pierce, Rubenfeld, & Morgan, 1991). Pierce et al. 
(2003, p. 86) define psychological ownership as "the state in which individuals feel 
as though the target of ownership or a piece of it is 'theirs'." It is thus 
conceptualized as a psychological state of mind, in contrast to a stable personality 
trait (cp. Pierce et al., 2003; Pierce, Kostova, & Dirks, 2001). The concept of 
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psychological ownership builds on the long history of philosophical and 
psychological research on the genesis of possessive tendencies and the psychology 
that something is "mine" (Etzioni, 1991; Furby, 1978b; Sartre, 1969). While formal 
or legal ownership is not necessary to develop feelings of ownership (Pierce et al., 
2003; Pierce et al., 2001), scholars also claim that formal ownership has to induce 
feelings of ownership as a first step to have any effects (Pierce & Furo, 1990). 
Psychological ownership as a psychological state of mind satisfies three underlying 
human motives (cp. Pierce et al., 2001). First, it can nurture feelings of efficacy, 
since "to have" is the ultimate form of control, whereby being in control leads to 
the perception that one "is the cause" and that one has altered or is able to alter the 
circumstances (Beggan, 1992). Second, ownership helps people define themselves, 
express their self-identity to others and maintain the continuity of the self. As such, 
possessions or what is perceived to be mine can have an identity forging and 
maintaining function (Kamptner, 1989; Price, Arnould, & Folkman Curasi, 2000). 
Finally, psychological ownership scholars suggest that having a place, and hence 
the need for territoriality and security may also be nurtured by ownership 
(Porteous, 1976). The target of ownership feelings finally becomes part of the 
psychological owner's identity; one's possessions are felt as extensions of the self 
(Belk, 1988; Dittmar, 1992; Pierce et al., 2001).  
Due to the sense of possession as the conceptual core (cp. Furby, 1978b; 
Rudmin & Berry, 1987), psychological ownership is distinctive from concepts such 
as organizational commitment, organizational identification, and job involvement 
(cp. Pierce et al., 2001; Van Dyne & Pierce, 2004). Psychological ownership asks, 
"How much do I feel this organization is mine" (Van Dyne & Pierce, 2004, p. 443). 
In contrast, organizational commitment asks, "Why should I maintain my 
membership in this organization" (cp. Meyer & Allen, 1997); organizational 
identification asks, "Who am I" (Dutton, Dukerich, & Harquail, 1994); and job 
involvement asks, "How important is the job and job performance to my self-
image?" (Lawler & Hall, 1970).  
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Research has documented numerous pro-organizational attitudinal and 
behavioural consequences of employees' psychological ownership toward the 
organization including affective commitment (Avey et al., 2009; Pendleton, 
Wilson, & Wright, 1998), extra-role behavior (Pierce, Van Dyne, & Cummings, 
1992; VandeWalle, Van Dyne, & Kostova, 1995), and organizational citizenship 
behavior (Avey et al., 2009; Van Dyne & Pierce, 2004). However, a relationship 
with middle-level managers' entrepreneurial behaviour has not been explored yet. 
As this paper argues in the following, there is good reason to believe that 
psychological ownership will induce middle-level managers to exhibit 
entrepreneurial behaviour.  
 
4.4 Hypotheses 
4.4.1 Psychological ownership and entrepreneurial behavior 
There are numerous attitudinal and behavioral consequences when middle-level 
managers exhibit psychological ownership toward the firm they are working for. In 
the presence of feelings of a sense of place, belonging and personal space, middle-
level managers will experience "mere ownership" (Beggan, 1992) and develop 
feelings of attachment and belonging. As a result, the firm will be experienced as 
part of the middle-level manager's extended self, part of their identity (Belk, 1988; 
Dittmar, 1992). In turn, the human desire to maintain, protect, and enhance that 
identity leads to heightened feelings of responsibility for the ownership target 
(Dipboye, 1977; Druskat & Kubzansky, 1995; Korman, 1970; Pierce et al., 2001). 
These feelings, in turn, lead to the investment of time and energy to advance the 
cause of the organization, to be protective, caring, and nurturing (Pierce et al., 
2001). In other words, middle-level managers who are psychological owners of the 
company feel responsible for it; they want to protect, care for, and nurture it; to 
make it prosper, grow, and survive. Entrepreneurial behavior is proposed as a 
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suitable means to achieve these aims. With both of its main elements, namely own 
entrepreneurial actions and support of others' attempts to do the same, it is a core 
aspect of corporate entrepreneurship (e.g., Hornsby et al., 2002; Kuratko, Ireland et 
al., 2005; Pearce et al., 1997), which in turn has positive effects on firm 
performance, for instance in the form of profitability, survival, and growth (Covin 
& Slevin, 1991; Lumpkin & Dess, 1996; Rogoff & Heck, 2003). Put differently, 
middle-level managers' desire to enhance the firm induced by psychological 
ownership can be satisfied by behaving entrepreneurially.  
Furthermore, supporting such an argument for a positive relationship between 
psychological ownership and entrepreneurial behavior, it has been suggested that 
ownership feelings are accompanied by self-initiated behavior that adds value to 
the firm because such behavior satisfies the personal need for control and 
strengthens the feeling of personal efficacy (Pierce et al., 2001). It has also been 
proposed that ownership feelings and perceptions of psychological empowerment 
(Spreitzer, 1995) are positively related to a hands-on work attitude (Crant, 2000) 
and the inclination to take the initiative and move ahead with novel ideas. In other 
words, middle-level managers who perceive being in control and having the right 
to have a voice through ownership feelings will be inclined to achieve 
organizational goals by exhibiting entrepreneurial behavior.  
In addition, scholars claim that legal ownership in a firm enhances the 
proclivity to invest in innovation and novel ways of action (Cho, 1998; Hill & 
Snell, 1989). For legal ownership to generate these effects, Pierce and Furo (1990) 
argue that ownership feelings have to evolve as a first step. As these ownership 
feelings, in turn, are also possible in the absence of legal ownership (Pierce et al., 
2003; Pierce et al., 2001), for instance when a middle-level managers perceives 
that the organization he or she works for is "his" or "her" even though he or she 
does not own company shares, these psychological owners are likely to exhibit an 
increased proclivity to innovation and novel ways of action as well, which 
manifests itself in entrepreneurial behavior.  
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Moreover, scholars propose that psychological ownership may turn agents, 
such as non-owning middle-level managers, into psychological principals from an 
agency theory perspective (Pierce et al., 2003). Consequently, the interests of 
principals and middle-level managers that perceive ownership feelings will be 
aligned (Eisenhardt, 1989a; Jensen & Meckling, 1976). Company performance has 
been established as ultimate goal of principals (Daily, Certo, Dalton, & 
Roengpitya, 2003; McDonald, Khanna, & Westphal, 2008). As shown before, 
corporate entrepreneurship is a main antecedent of company performance, whereas 
middle-level managers' entrepreneurial behavior is a core aspect of the former. Put 
differently, psychological ownership will bring middle-level managers to share the 
principals' ultimate goal of company performance. Entrepreneurial behavior, in 
turn, is a suitable means to contribute to this goal's achievement. The preceding 
arguments lead to the following hypothesis:  
Hypothesis 1: Middle-level managers’ psychological ownership toward 
the firm is positively related to their entrepreneurial behavior.  
4.4.2 Psychological ownership, organizational antecedents, and 
entrepreneurial behavior 
As illustrated previously, management support occurs by top-level management 
championing new ideas, providing resources, or institutionalizing entrepreneurial 
activity (Hornsby et al., 2002; Kuratko, Ireland et al., 2005; Stevenson & Jarillo, 
1990). When top-level management is willing to champion and support 
psychological owners' novel ideas, and if it is also perceived as such, this is an 
important signal. Middle-level managers then realize that ideas and entrepreneurial 
actions are welcome, and that they will be implemented in the organization, thus 
contributing to corporate entrepreneurship. Put differently, middle-level managers 
see that entrepreneurial actions will actually have an impact, which for instance 
helps to satisfy psychological owners' feelings of responsibility and their desire to 
care for, nurture, and enhance the organization (Pierce et al., 2001). Management 
support thus strengthens middle-level managers' willingness to implement own 
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entrepreneurial actions and to support those of others. In addition, when top-level 
management provides middle-level managers with resources that are necessary to 
implement own entrepreneurial actions and to support other's entrepreneurial 
behavior, this has positive effects as well. For example, support in the form of 
time, money and other resources enables middle-level managers to work on own 
ideas, to experiment, and to actually put new ideas into practice. Similarly, given 
the intermediary role of middle-level managers between top-level and operative-
level managers (Floyd & Wooldridge, 1992; Kuratko et al., 2004), they can use 
resources such as time and money to actively support entrepreneurial actions of 
subordinates, for example by assigning resources to entrepreneurial projects or 
giving subordinates free time that can be used for idea generation.  
In sum, management support signals middle-level managers who are 
psychological owners that entrepreneurial actions are highly valued and will 
actually make an impact. In addition, it provides middle-level managers with the 
resources that actually enable them to put this behavior in practice. When 
management support is low, psychological owners will perceive that 
entrepreneurial actions are not much appreciated, and have less resources at their 
hands to develop own ideas or to support others in doing so. Following these 
arguments it is proposed here that the positive relationship between psychological 
ownership and entrepreneurial behavior is stronger for situations with high 
management support than for situations with low management support. More 
formally stated:  
Hypothesis 2: Perceived management support moderates the relationship 
between middle-level managers' psychological ownership toward the 
organization and their entrepreneurial behavior, such that the 
relationship is stronger for high management support than for low 
management support.  
When middle-level managers perceive to have work discretion in the form of 
authority, responsibility and decision-making latitude, and when failure is tolerated 
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and excessive oversight is missing (Burgelman, 1983; Kuratko, Ireland et al., 2005; 
MacMillan et al., 1986), this also has important effects. In the presence of 
authority, responsibility and decision-making latitude, middle-level managers are 
likely to use this freedom and autonomy to satisfy their psychological ownership-
induced desire to enhance the organization through entrepreneurial behavior 
(Pierce et al., 2001). On one hand, they may use their possibilities to pursue own 
ideas and entrepreneurial ventures within the company by independently deciding 
on corresponding projects and actions. In addition, if excessive oversight is 
missing, they do not have to report and justify every move they make, which 
enables them to follow creative ideas without organizational constraints. Hence, 
work discretion can actually be used for entrepreneurial experimentation (Kuratko 
et al., 2001).  
Moreover, as work discretion increases middle-level managers ability and 
willingness to take risks in the pursuit of innovation, they will be more inclined to 
pursue own risky ideas and entrepreneurial ventures. These elements of work 
discretion can also be used for supporting subordinates' entrepreneurial behavior, 
for instance by approving and championing entrepreneurial projects of others 
without being forced to justify every decision in front of top-level management. 
Furthermore, the increased ability and willingness to take risks and the permission 
to learn from failures allows middle-level managers to support and take 
responsibility for risky entrepreneurial projects of subordinates. Given the desire of 
middle-level managers to act entrepreneurially induced by psychological 
ownership, they are likely to actually make use of the opportunities and freedom 
provided by high levels of work discretion. In situations with low work discretion, 
psychological owners have less power, autonomy, and freedom to put the desired 
entrepreneurial behavior into practice.  
Furthermore, their willingness to assume risk is lower, and they are eager to 
avoid mistakes. These aspects restrict their ability to implement own 
entrepreneurial actions, as well as their possibilities to support the action of others. 
Hence, it is proposed here that the positive relationship between psychological 
ownership and entrepreneurial behavior is stronger for situations with high work 
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discretion than for situations with low work discretion, which leads to the 
following hypothesis:  
Hypothesis 3: Perceived work discretion moderates the relationship 
between middle-level managers' psychological ownership toward the 
organization and their entrepreneurial behavior, such that the 
relationship is stronger for high work discretion than for low work 
discretion.  
When psychological owners perceive that reward systems are in place that 
honor entrepreneurial behavior by for instance positive feedback, recognition, and 
increased responsibilities, they have an additional incentive to exhibit such 
behavior. Put differently, entrepreneurial behavior will not only satisfy 
psychological owners' desire to protect, care for, and nurture the organization 
(Pierce et al., 2001), but it will also lead to official and desirable rewards by the 
organization. Consequently, middle-level managers have an additional incentive to 
implement own entrepreneurial actions and to support others'. Furthermore, as 
appropriate reward systems may increase middle-level managers' willingness to 
assume risk associated with entrepreneurial actions (Kuratko, Ireland et al., 2005), 
this will induce them to actually develop and pursue own ideas and entrepreneurial 
projects with the inherent risk of failure. In addition, these middle-level managers 
are also more willing to take responsibility for ideas and entrepreneurial actions of 
subordinates that might fail, which allows subordinates to pursue these actions. In 
case of low perceived rewards/reinforcement, however, the additional incentive for 
entrepreneurial behavior is lower, as is psychological owners' willingness to 
assume risk associated with entrepreneurial actions. This leads to the hypothesis 
that the positive relationship between psychological ownership and entrepreneurial 
behavior is stronger for situations with high rewards/reinforcement than for 
situations with low rewards/reinforcement. More formally stated:  
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Hypothesis 4: Perceived rewards/reinforcement moderates the 
relationship between middle-level managers' psychological ownership 
toward the organization and their entrepreneurial behavior, such that the 
relationship is stronger for high rewards/reinforcement than for low 
rewards/reinforcement.  
4.5 Method 
4.5.1 Sample and data collection 
The sample consists of the responses of 1,024 employees of companies based in 
Germany and German-speaking Switzerland. In October 2009, valid email 
addresses of 10,750 management-level employees were randomly retrieved from 
these countries' largest employee database. An identification-based online survey 
instrument prevented multiple responses. The response rate of 9.5% was achieved 
using one reminder email. Research has found that a 10-12% response rate is 
typical for studies that target executives in upper echelons (Geletkanycz, 1998; 
Hambrick et al., 1993; Koch & McGrath, 1996) and managers in small to mid-
sized firms (MacDougall & Robinson, 1990). In addition, sending out emails 
including a survey link without prior notice has been found to generate a lower 
response rate than other approaches (Kaplowitz, Hadlock, & Levine, 2004). 
Accordingly, the study's response rate is regarded as comparable to studies in 
similar settings using a comparable data collection methodology. 
Respondents represented various departments of companies from different 
industries. For the analysis, only questionnaires in which all items necessary for the 
paper's purposes received responses were included. Due to the unique role of 
middle-level managers (cp. Floyd & Lane, 2000; Floyd & Wooldridge, 1992), top-
level managers and operative-level managers were excluded. Respondents were 
asked in the questionnaire to indicate which hierarchy level best described their 
current position in the company. This reduced the final sample to 403 responses. 
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Average company size was 1001 employees; respondents' average age was 44.72 
years; 34.8% of respondents were female; and average organizational tenure was 
12.10 years. 50.2% of the respondents were working in companies based in 
Germany.  
4.5.2 Measures 
4.5.2.1 Psychological ownership  
Psychological ownership toward the organization was measured with a seven-
item instrument developed and validated by Pierce et al. (1992), with further 
validation evidence provided by Pierce et al. (2004). It is commonly used in 
empirical psychological ownership studies (e.g., O’Driscoll et al., 2006; 
VandeWalle et al., 1995). Sample items include "This is my organization" and "I 
feel a very high degree of personal ownership for this organization". The seven-
point Likert-type scale ranged from 1 = strongly disagree to 7 = strongly agree. 
After translating the scale from English into German, two independent bilingual 
experts who did not know the original scale retranslated the items from German 
into English. Together with a native English speaker, the original English version 
of the scale was compared with the translation. No major differences were found. 
This translation procedure was applied for all measures used in this study that can 
be found in Appendix A. Cronbach's Alpha for psychological ownership was 0.89.  
4.5.2.2 Organizational factors 
Here the CEAI items for perceived management support, work discretion and 
rewards/reinforcement were used (Hornsby et al., 2002); those with factor loadings 
below 0.6 were excluded (cp. Nunnally & Bernstein, 1994). The excluded items 
were the same ones that failed to reach factor loadings of 0.6 in Hornsby et al. 
(2002). This resulted in 10 items for management support, 7 for work discretion, 
and 3 for rewards/reinforcement. Sample items are "People are often encouraged 
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to take calculated risks with new ideas around here" for management support, "I 
have much autonomy on my job and am left on my own to do my own work" for 
work discretion, and "My supervisor will increase my job responsibilities if I am 
performing well in my job" for rewards/reinforcement. All items were rated from 1 
= strongly disagree to 7 = strongly agree on a seven-point Likert-type scale. 
Cronbach's Alpha was 0.92 for management support, 0.93 for work discretion, and 
0.79 for rewards/reinforcement.  
4.5.2.3 Entrepreneurial behavior 
As illustrated, the two main elements of middle-level managers' entrepreneurial 
behavior are own entrepreneurial actions, for instance in the form of idea 
generation, and the support and encouragement of others' entrepreneurial behavior 
(cp. Ghoshal & Bartlett, 1994; Kuratko, 2010; Kuratko et al., 2004). Consequently, 
both of these dimensions need to be considered. While other studies focus on the 
first dimension only by capturing the number of ideas suggested and/or 
implemented with or without organizational approval (Hornsby et al., 1999; 
Hornsby et al., 2009; Kuratko, Hornsby et al., 2005), this study applies a more 
comprehensive measure. For the first dimension I used four items inspired by 
Dyer, Gregersen, and Christensen (2008) and Hornsby et al. (1999; 2009). 
Examples are "I often come up with new and innovative ideas" and "I often 
generate new ideas by observing our customers". To capture the second dimension 
four items from Pearce et al. (1997) were adapted, such as "I encourage others to 
take the initiative for their own ideas" and "I actively promote the good ideas of 
others". Items were rated from 1 = strongly disagree to 7 = strongly agree on a 
seven-point Likert-type scale. Cronbach's Alpha reached 0.82.  
4.5.2.4 Control variables 
As the competitive environment of a company may impact entrepreneurial 
activities (cp. Antoncic & Hisrich, 2001), two dummy variables for industry and 
service sectors were included. Legal arrangements and social programs that may 
influence employee conceptualizations of ownership can differ between countries 
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(Rousseau & Shperling, 2003), hence, dummy variables for Switzerland and 
Germany were used. Additional control variables similar to other empirical studies 
on middle-level managers' entrepreneurial behavior were company age and size, as 
well as respondents' age, gender, and tenure (see e.g., Goodale et al., 2010; 
Hornsby et al., 2009). Company size, measured in number of employees, was not 
normally distributed and thus transformed with the natural logarithm. In addition, 
the existence of stock ownership of middle-level managers was included as a 
dummy variable, as formal ownership may affect employees' pro-organizational 
behaviour (Daily, Dalton et al., 2003; Dalton, Daily, Certo, & Roengpitya, 2003). 
Moreover, remuneration systems that are tied to company success might have an 
effect (e.g., Block & MacMillan, 1993), and a corresponding dummy variable was 
thus used. Last, membership of the owning family, if there is one, was accounted 
for with a dummy variable, as this might also lead to behavioural consequences 
(Sharma & Manikutty, 2005).  
 
4.6 Analysis 
To explore the possibility of non-response bias, data from early and late 
respondents was compared using ANOVA. This test is based on the assumption 
that late respondents are more similar to non-respondents than are early 
respondents (Oppenheim, 1966). There were no significant differences in the mean 
scores of the variables, which mitigates non-response bias concerns. I also 
conducted an ANOVA between respondents who answered all relevant questions 
and those who did not. Again, no significant differences emerged. To address the 
potential of common method bias, Harman's single factor test (1967) as suggested 
by Podsakoff and Organ (1986) was applied. Even though it has limitations (cp. 
Podsakoff et al., 2003), this procedure is still used as an initial test for common 
method bias. After entering all study variables into an exploratory factor analysis 
(cp. Podsakoff et al., 2003), a six-factor solution emerged, which accounted for 
61.51% of the total variance. The first factor explained 17.46% of the variance, 
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which provides initial evidence that common method bias was not a major problem 
because no single factor accounted for the majority of variance. As an additional 
precaution against common method bias and to assess the validity and 
distinctiveness of the measures of psychological ownership, management support, 
work discretion, and rewards/reinforcement, a confirmatory factor analysis was 
conducted (Podsakoff et al., 2003). I compared the fit of a four-factor structure to 
that of a one-factor structure. The four-factor structure the data significantly better 
that the one-factor structure (difference in χ2=6136.596, df=6, p<0.001), which 
indicates that the applied measures were not only theoretically, but also empirically 
distinguishable. This further mitigates common method bias concerns (cp. 
Podsakoff et al., 2003). To test for the potential of multicollinearity, I centered the 
variables (cp. Cronbach, 1987) and found that the Variance Inflation Factor did not 
exceed 2.11, and the condition index did not exceed 3.75. These levels suggest that 
multicollinearity is not a concern (Hair et al., 2006). 
 
4.7 Results 
Means, standard deviations, and Pearson correlations are presented in the 
following Table. Similar to other empirical CEAI studies the correlations between 
the CEAI factors were quite high (cp. Holt et al., 2007; Hornsby et al., 1999; 
Hornsby et al., 2009; Kuratko, Hornsby et al., 2005).  
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The results of the regression analyses are reported in the following Table.  
Variables Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
Constant 4.375 2.983 2.629 
    
Control variables    
Germany 0.038 0.078 0.062 
Industry 0.099 0.059 0.051 
Service -0.006 -0.020 -0.022 
Company age 0.035 0.025 0.018 
Company size (ln) 0.075 0.071 0.068 
Family membership 0.052 0.018 0.031 
Employee age -0.051 -0.033 -0.048 
Gender  -0.042 -0.078 -0.075 
Tenure 0.026 -0.043 -0.037 
Stock ownership -0.041 -0.038 -0.036 
Performance-based pay -0.041 0.043 0.047 
    
Independent variables / moderator    
Management support  0.238*** 0.277*** 
Work discretion  0.158** 0.159* 
Rewards/reinforcement  0.018 0.026 
Psychologial ownership  0.106* 0.148** 
    
Interaction terms    
P.O. times Management support   0.144* 
P.O. times Work discretion   -0.033 
P.O. times Rewards/reinforcement   0.034 
    
Adjusted R2 0.005 0.150 0.161 
F-Statistics 1.199 5.722*** 5.278*** 
Delta R2  0.149*** 0.017* 
    
N=403; *p < .05; **p < .01; ***p < .001 
Table 6: Results of regression analyses of paper 2 
Model 1 constitutes the control model. In model 2, the main effects of 
psychological ownership and the three CEAI factors management support, work 
discretion, and rewards/reinforcement were added, which significantly increased 
the explained variance over and above model 1. Psychological ownership had a 
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significant and positive relationship with entrepreneurial behavior (coeff = .106, p 
< .05), which supports hypothesis 1. The main effects of management support and 
work discretion on entrepreneurial behavior were also positively significant (coeff 
= .238, p < .001 and coeff = .158, p < .01). In model 3, I estimated the full model 
by adding the three interaction terms, which significantly increased the explained 
variance over and above model 2. The interaction term of management support and 
psychological ownership was positively significant (coeff = .144, p < 0.05). This 
supports hypothesis 2. As the interactions terms of both work discretion and 
rewards/reinforcement with psychological ownership failed to reach significance, 
hypotheses 3 and 4 have to be rejected. The nature of the significant moderation 
effect of management support in the psychological ownership - entrepreneurial 
behavior relationship is plotted in figure 1, with simple slopes one standard 
deviation below and above the mean of the management support measure.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5: Interaction plot of management support and psychological ownership 
Entrepreneurial behavior 
1 S.D. below the mean 
Management 
support 1 S.D. 
above the mean 
1 S.D. above the mean 
Management 
support 1 S.D. 
below the mean 
Psychological 
Ownership 
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As figure 1 shows, with increasing levels of psychological ownership, there is 
an increase in entrepreneurial behavior. This increase is greater for middle-level 
managers with high perceived management support than for managers with low 
perceived management support, in accordance with hypothesis 2.  
 
4.8 Discussion 
The present study set out to shed a more nuanced light on the evolvement of 
middle-level manager's entrepreneurial behavior. Analysis of a sample of 403 
middle-level managers leads to a number of valuable findings and contributions.  
First, the study contributes to entrepreneurial behavior literature. Psychological 
ownership is introduced as an individual-level state of mind that triggers middle-
level managers' entrepreneurial behavior. The study thus validates an individual-
level factor that differentiates entrepreneurial from non-entrepreneurial middle-
level managers by making them decide to act entrepreneurially. This supports the 
argument that also individuals' decisions matter with regard to entrepreneurial 
behavior (Goldsby et al., 2006; Kuratko, Ireland et al., 2005). On a more general 
level, this finding supports the view of many scholars that elements of the person 
should not be abandoned in entrepreneurship research (Hmieleski & Baron, 2009; 
Hmieleski & Corbett, 2008; Schjoedt & Shaver, 2007). The study also adds to the 
field by explicitly investigating a combination of individual-level and 
organizational-level factors in the context of middle-level managers' 
entrepreneurial behavior. Results show that management support is able to 
strengthen the relationship between psychological ownership and entrepreneurial 
behavior. Hence, providing psychological owners with active support and 
resources, for instance in terms of money or time, allows them to fully exploit their 
entrepreneurial potential. This illustrates the potential of a meaningful combination 
of individual and organizational factors and supports the argument of numerous 
scholars (e.g., Kuratko, 2010; Kuratko, Ireland et al., 2005; Naffziger et al., 1994).  
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However, no moderation effect for work discretion can be found. This could be 
explained by the underlying effects of psychological ownership. As illustrated, 
psychological ownership nurtures feelings of efficacy and being in control, leading 
to the perception that one is able to alter the circumstances (Beggan, 1992; Pierce 
et al., 2001). In addition, psychological ownership can lead to self-initiated 
behavior, a hands-on working attitude, feelings of empowerment, and the 
inclination to take the initiative and move ahead with novel ideas (Crant, 2000; 
Pierce et al., 2001; Spreitzer, 1995). With regard to work discretion this could 
mean that psychological owners do not care if they are officially authorized by top 
management to decide on certain things. It is therefore suggested that as 
psychological owners feel in control, empowered, and able to alter their 
environment, they boldly move ahead, ignoring formal or organizational 
restrictions and boundaries. Consequently, in cases with officially granted high 
work discretion, the additional effect on entrepreneurial behavior will be almost 
non-existent, as psychological owners take their freedom regardless of formally 
granted work discretion. Also rewards/reinforcement fails to strengthen the 
psychological ownership – entrepreneurial behavior relationship. This could be due 
to the claim that psychological ownership may turn agents, such as non-owning 
middle-level managers, into psychological principals. In that case, their interests 
will be aligned with those of the principals, which is expressed in increased 
entrepreneurial behavior. For those psychological owners, it may be irrelevant if 
they get official rewards or reinforcement by the organization, as they already 
behave in its interest in the absence of these rewards. Altogether, these findings 
illustrate the potential of psychological ownership as an antecedent to middle-level 
managers' entrepreneurial behavior. Another contribution to the field is that this 
study is the first to apply a measure that explicitly incorporates the two main 
elements of middle-level manager's entrepreneurial behavior, namely 
implementing own entrepreneurial actions and supporting others' entrepreneurial 
behavior (Floyd & Lane, 2000; Kuratko, 2010). Previous studies have focused on 
middle-level managers' idea generation only (e.g., Hornsby et al., 2009; Kuratko, 
Hornsby et al., 2005).  
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Second, the paper adds to psychological ownership literature by introducing the 
concept in the context of middle-level managers' entrepreneurial behavior. 
Validating entrepreneurial behavior as a correlate of psychological ownership 
speaks to scholars who investigate behavioral consequences of psychological 
ownership (Avey et al., 2009; Pendleton et al., 1998; Van Dyne & Pierce, 2004). 
The same is true for the finding that psychological ownership interacts with 
organizational factors when producing its effects. Finally, business practitioners 
can benefit from the results. They are strongly encouraged to foster their middle-
level managers' psychological ownership, as it has a strong effect on their 
entrepreneurial behavior. Moreover, management support in terms of resources 
should be increased, as it can strengthen this effect. Action with regard to work 
discretion and rewards/reinforcement, in contrast, does not seem to be necessary 
when psychological ownership is present.  
 
4.9 Limitations and future research 
There are some limitations that must be acknowledged. Because the study is 
based on cross-sectional survey data, uncertainty in terms of causality may exist. 
However, the theoretical considerations as well as the validated moderation effects 
should lend validity to the interpretation. Second, all respondents worked in firms 
based in Germany or German-speaking Switzerland, which could lead to a cultural 
bias compared to studies in other settings (Rousseau & Shperling 2003). Third, all 
variables were measured by the self-perceptions of a single source. However, at 
least for psychological ownership and perceptions of organizational factors, theory 
requires the use of middle-level managers’ self-perceptions. In addition, up to date 
statistical tests mitigate common method bias concerns.  
This study spurs future research in several ways. Given the important role that 
psychological ownership plays in the context of middle-level managers' 
entrepreneurial behavior, more research is needed on how the maximum 
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entrepreneurial potential of middle-level managers that are psychological owners 
could be exploited. Most importantly, the interplay of psychological ownership 
with organizational factors should be explored further. For example, three-way 
interactions between psychological ownership and organizational factors could be 
investigated. In addition, it would be interesting to see if the effects of 
organizational factors differ when own entrepreneurial actions and supporting 
others' actions are investigated separately. Moreover, the study's insights are not 
necessarily limited to middle-level managers. As Hornsby et al. (2009) have 
shown, results may differ depending on managers' hierarchy level, which could be 
investigated further. In addition, research could be done in the context of family 
firms. Business families are especially reluctant to implement employee stock 
ownership plans, as they oppose the dominant wish of many families to control 
legal ownership across generations (Chua et al., 1999; Gomez-Mejia et al., 2007). 
Thus, psychological ownership as an alternative mechanism to foster agents' pro-
organizational behavior, such as entrepreneurial behavior, is of special interest. 
Here, family business specific factors in the psychological ownership – 
entrepreneurial behavior relationship could be explored. Lastly, the study's findings 
could be verified in a different cultural context.  
 
4.10 Conclusion 
Summing up, this study introduces psychological ownership as an individual-
level antecedent to middle-level managers' entrepreneurial behavior and 
investigates its interaction with organizational antecedents. The analysis of a 
sample of 403 middle-level managers shows that psychological ownership is 
indeed positively related to entrepreneurial behavior, whereas this relationship is 
strengthened by management support. These findings constitute valuable 
contributions to entrepreneurial behavior and psychological ownership literatures, 
as well as to practice.  
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4.11 Appendix 
Variable / α Item text 
Psychological 
ownership  
(0.89) 
This is MY organization. 
I sense that this organization is OUR company. 
I feel a very high degree of personal ownership for this organization 
I sense that this is MY company. 
This is OUR company. 
Most of the people that work for this organization feel as though they 
own the company. 
It is hard for me to think about this organization as MINE (reversed) 
Management 
support (0.92) 
My organization is quick to use improved work methods 
My organization is quick to use improved work methods that are 
developed by workers 
Upper management is aware and very receptive to my ideas and 
suggestions.  
Many top managers have been known for their experience with the 
innovation process.  
Individual risk takers are often recognized for their willingness to 
champion new projects, whether eventually successful or not.  
People are often encouraged to take calculated risks with new ideas 
around here.  
The term "risk taker" is considered a positive attribute for people in my 
work area.   
This organization supports many small and experimental projects 
realizing that some will undoubtedly fail.   
A worker with a good idea is often given free time to develop that idea.  
There is considerable desire among people in the organization for 
generating new ideas without regard to crossing departmental or 
functional boundaries.  
Work discretion 
(0.93) 
I feel that I am my own boss and do not have to double check all of my 
decisions. 
This organization provides the chance to be creative and try my own 
methods of doing the job.  
This organization provides freedom to use my own judgment 
I have the freedom to decide what I do on my job. 
It is basically my own responsibility to decide how my job gets done.  
I almost always get to decide what I do on my job.  
I have much autonomy on my job and am left on my own to do my own 
work.  
Table 7: Scale items and reliabilities of paper 2 
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Rewards / 
reinforcement  
(0.79) 
My supervisor will increase my job responsibilities if I am performing 
well in my job.   
My supervisor will give me special recognition if my work performance 
is especially good.  
My manager would tell his / her boss if my work was outstanding.   
Entrepreneurial 
behavior (0.82) 
I often come up with new and innovative ideas. 
I often generate new ideas by observing the world. 
I often get new ideas by observing our customers. 
I often come to new ideas when observing how people interact with our 
products and services. 
I encourage others to take the initiative for their own ideas. 
I inspire others to think about their work in new ways.  
I actively help others find new ways to improve our products and 
services.  
I actively promote the good ideas of others.  
Table 7: Scale items and reliabilities of paper 2 (continued) 
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5 Affective Commitment and Job Satisfaction Among 
Non-family Employees: Investigating the Roles of 
Justice Perceptions and Psychological Ownership 
Philipp Sieger, Fabian Bernhard, and Urs Frey 
 
5.1 Abstract 
Due to numerous characteristics often attributed to family firms, they constitute 
a unique context for non-family employees’ justice perceptions. These are linked to 
non-family employees’ pro-organizational attitudes and behaviors, which are 
essential for family firms' success. Even though scholarly interest in non-family 
employees' justice perceptions has increased, more research is still needed, also 
because the mechanism connecting justice perceptions and favorable outcomes is 
not fully understood yet. We address this gap by explicitly investigating non-
family employees’ justice perceptions and by introducing psychological ownership 
as a mediator in the relationships between justice perceptions (distributive and 
procedural) and common work attitudes (affective commitment and job 
satisfaction). Our analysis of a sample of 310 non-family employees from 
Germany and German-speaking Switzerland reveals that psychological ownership 
mediates the relationships between distributive justice and affective commitment 
as well as job satisfaction. This represents valuable contributions to family 
business research, organizational justice and psychological ownership literature, 
and to practice.  
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5.2 Introduction 
Family firms are often linked with characteristics such as paternalistic-
autocratic rule, founder-centric cultures, lack of delegation, ingroup-outgroup 
perceptions of non-family employees, altruism, and nepotism (cp. Barnett & 
Kellermanns, 2006; Kelly et al., 2000; Padgett & Morris, 2005; Schein, 1983; 
Schulze et al., 2001). These unique aspects constitute potential sources of injustice 
perceptions of non-family employees (Barnett & Kellermanns, 2006; Blondel, 
Carlock, & Heyden, 2000; Carsrud, 2006). This is critical for family firms, as 
employees' justice perceptions have been linked to positive work outcomes such as 
affective commitment (cp. Allen & Meyer, 1990; Meyer et al., 2002; Van Dyne & 
Pierce, 2004) and job satisfaction (e.g., Colquitt et al., 2001; Janssen & Van 
Yperen, 2004; Judge et al., 2001). Fostering these attitudes among non-family 
employees is essential to family firms' success and survival (Barnett & 
Kellermanns, 2006; Chrisman, Chua, & Litz, 2003; Chua, Chrisman, & Sharma, 
2003). As a consequence, justice perceptions of non-family employees in family 
firms have received increasing scholarly attention in recent years (cp. Barnett & 
Kellermanns, 2006; Lubatkin, Ling, & Schulze, 2007). However, the amount of 
existing research in that context is still regarded as insufficient (Carsrud, 2006), 
also because it is not yet fully understood how exactly justice perceptions weave 
their way into favorable work attitudes. Even though scholars have intensively 
tried to explain this mechanism, for example by applying social exchange theory 
(e.g, Masterson, Lewis, Goldman, & Taylor, 2000; Tekleab, Takeuchi, & Taylor, 
2005), Choi and Chen (2007) point out that "there is still very limited knowledge of 
any mechanism through which they are connected" (p. 688).  
We address this gap by empirically investigating justice perceptions of non-
family employees, explicitly focusing on the mechanism how they lead to affective 
commitment and job satisfaction. We introduce the concept of psychological 
ownership as a factor that connects non-family employees' justice perceptions and 
these work attitudes. Psychological ownership is defined as "the state in which 
individuals feel as though the target of ownership or a piece of that target is 
'theirs' " (Pierce et al., 2003, p. 86). This approach is promising as formal equity 
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ownership among non-family employees is uncommon due to the dominant wish 
of many families to control legal ownership across generations (Chua et al., 1999; 
Gomez-Mejia et al., 2007). Feelings of ownership, however, can exist without 
formal ownership, and can have similar effects as intended by formal ownership 
(Pierce et al., 2003). Thus, ownership feelings are of special relevance for family 
firms. Moreover, psychological ownership seems to fit well into the context of 
justice perceptions and positive work outcomes. This is because on the one hand, 
recent initial findings indicate that there may exist a link between justice 
perceptions and psychological ownership (Chi & Han, 2008). On the other hand, 
scholars have established positive relationships between psychological ownership 
and both affective commitment (Bernhard & O’Driscoll, 2011; Mayhew, 
Ashkanasy, Bramble, & Gardner, 2007; O’Driscoll et al., 2006) and job 
satisfaction (Avey et al., 2009; Van Dyne & Pierce, 2004). However, to date, these 
fragmented insights have not yet been integrated, and they have not been applied in 
the family firm context either.  
Hence, we hypothesize that psychological ownership mediates the 
relationships between two dimensions of organizational justice perceptions 
(distributive and procedural) and two common work attitudes (affective 
commitment and job satisfaction). We test the hypotheses on a random sample of 
310 non-family employees from family firms based in Germany and German-
speaking Switzerland. The findings based on mediation analysis constitute valuable 
contributions to family business research, organizational justice and psychological 
ownership literature, as well as to practice.  
The paper is structured as follows. First, we introduce the theoretical 
foundations of the main concepts of this study. Second, we theoretically derive our 
hypotheses. Third, we illustrate the sample as well as the methods used. Fourth, we 
present the empirical findings. Fifth, we enter into a discussion of the results, 
contributions, and limitations of the study, and suggest avenues for future research. 
We then offer our final conclusions. 
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5.3 Theoretical foundations 
5.3.1 Organizational justice 
Due to the interaction between the family and the business system, family firms 
constitute a special environment for non-family employees to work (cp. Beehr, 
Drexler, & Faulkner, 1997; Habbershon et al., 2003; Lansberg, 1983). They face 
the unique situation that they are part of the business but not part of the family 
system (Mitchell, Morse, & Sharma, 2003). This situation entails unique effects on 
non-family employees' justice perceptions (Barnett & Kellermanns, 2006).  
Examples for potential family business specific peculiarities that might lead to 
perceptions of injustice among non-family employees are nepotism (Padgett & 
Morris, 2005), authoritarian leadership style (Tagiuri & Davis, 1992), human 
resource practices generally biased against non-family members (Barnett & 
Kellermanns, 2006; Lubatkin et al., 2007; Schulze et al., 2001), ingroup-outgroup 
perceptions of non-family employees (Barnett & Kellermanns, 2006), founder-
centric cultures (Schein, 1983), and lack of delegation (cp. Kelly et al., 2000). In 
addition, when the owning family uses its power and authority to serve family 
rather than business interests, for instance by seeking perquisites for private 
consumption (Davis, Allen, & Hayes, 2010), this behavior can give rise to non-
owners’ perceptions of injustice. Even though perceptions of injustice among non-
family employees may not occur in all family firms in general (cp. Barnett & 
Kellermanns, 2006), family firms seem to be particularly susceptible to factors 
leading to these perceptions. For that reason, understanding non-family employees' 
justice perceptions and how they impact pro-organizational outcomes on the 
individual level is a topic of essential relevance to family firms.  
In recent years, a few conceptual works on justice perceptions in family firms 
have emerged. Barnett & Kellermanns (2006) theorized how the degree of family 
involvement may influence non-family employees’ justice perceptions through fair 
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or unfair human resource practices. Lubatkin et al. (2007) drew on organizational 
justice literature to explain agency costs in family firms. However, empirical 
research on non-family employees’ justice perceptions is regarded as scarce 
(Barnett & Kellermanns, 2006; Carsrud, 2006). 
In contrast, organizational behavior literature has intensively investigated 
organizational justice (cp. Colquitt et al., 2001; Cropanzano, Byrne, Bobocel, & 
Rupp, 2001). It is concerned with employees’ subjective fairness perceptions in 
their employment relationship (Byrne & Cropanzano, 2001; Greenberg, 1990). 
While four dimensions of organizational justice have been established, scholars 
agree that employees mainly draw on distributive and procedural justice 
perceptions when deciding how to react to the overall organization, whereas 
interpersonal and informational justice perceptions seem to be more relevant when 
referring to authority figures such as supervisors (cp. Bies & Moag, 1986; Colquitt 
et al., 2001; Walumbwa, Cropanzano, & Hartnell, 2009). In the light of this paper’s 
goal to investigate the link between justice perceptions and non-family employees’ 
organization-related attitudes, we limit our considerations to distributive and 
procedural justice. 
Distributive justice refers to the perceived fairness of outcome distributions (cp. 
Colquitt et al., 2001). Typical examples of organizational outcomes are salaries, 
benefits, or promotions (cp. Colquitt, 2001; Colquitt et al., 2001). A distribution is 
perceived to be just if it is consistent with chosen allocation norms (Fortin, 2008) 
such as the widely applied equity theory (e.g., Adams, 1965; Colquitt et al., 2001). 
Equity theory states that people are less concerned about the absolute level of 
outcomes for the individual but rather whether the outcomes are fair (Colquitt et 
al., 2001). In family firms, non-family employees thus compare their own 
input/output ratio to that of other individuals within their reference frame, for 
example with family members that are also working in the company. If the ratios 
are unequal, inequity is perceived, and the distribution is regarded as unjust. 
Procedural justice refers to the perceived fairness of the allocation process that 
leads to outcomes (Colquitt et al., 2001; Walumbwa et al., 2009). Thibaut and 
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Walker (1975) found that the ability to influence or control the allocation process 
is able to increase individuals’ perceived fairness, even if the outcome itself cannot 
be influenced. Existing research has linked these two justice dimensions with 
affective commitment (e.g., Begley, Lee, & Hui, 2006; Jones & Martens, 2009; 
Masterson et al., 2000), job satisfaction (e.g., Jones & Martens, 2009; Lam, 
Schaubroeck, & Aryee, 2002; Masterson et al., 2000), trust in the organization 
(Colquitt et al., 2001; Masterson et al., 2000), and organizational citizenship 
behavior (Aryee, Budhwar, & Chen, 2002; Tepper & Taylor, 2003). Recently, Chi 
and Han (2008) found initial evidence for a potential link to psychological 
ownership.  
Various scholars have given insight into the mechanism that connects justice 
perceptions with outcomes such as affective commitment and job satisfaction. The 
most widely applied perspective is social exchange theory (cp. Erdogan, Liden, & 
Kraimer, 2006; Masterson et al., 2000; Tekleab et al., 2005), whereas also self-
esteem (Tyler & Blader, 2000), trust (e.g., Lind, 2001; Van den Bos, Lind, & 
Wilke, 2001), and organizational identification (Carmon, Miller, Raile, & Roers, 
2010) have been investigated. Despite these efforts, Choi and Chen (2007) refer to 
the relationship between distributive justice and affective commitment and point 
out that "there is still very limited knowledge of any mechanism through which 
they are connected" (p. 688). Similarly, Aryee et al. (2002) conclude that existing 
social exchange research is "not without limitations" (p. 268). Judge & Colquitt 
(2004) state that the underlying theoretical mechanisms are "less clear" compared 
to the effects of justice (p. 395).  
In the organizational justice literature, both distributive and procedural justice 
perceptions are commonly situated in the context of appraisal interviews (Colquitt 
et al., 2001). Correspondingly, distributive justice refers to the outcome employees 
receive from their work (pay and promotion) that has been agreed on in their last 
appraisal interview. Procedural justice, in turn, refers to the process that was 
applied in that interview to negotiate the abovementioned outcomes (cp. also 
Masterson et al., 2000). Referring to family firms, Barnett & Kellermanns (2006) 
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argue that different family business specific factors, such as the level of family 
influence, affect human resource practices in terms of performance appraisal, 
compensation, and promotion (cp. also Lubatkin et al., 2007; Schulze et al., 2001). 
Thus, we believe that investigating non-family employees' justice perceptions in 
the appraisal interview context is appropriate.  
5.3.2 Psychological ownership  
Employees’ ownership feelings toward the organization they work for, labeled 
psychological ownership, have received considerable scholarly attention in recent 
years (Avey et al., 2009; Pierce & Jussila, 2009; Pierce et al., 2003). When 
employees perceive ownership of the organization, it becomes part of the 
psychological owner's identity and is felt as extension of the self (Belk, 1988; 
Dittmar, 1992). In general, psychological ownership may exist independently of 
formal ownership (Pierce et al., 2001). Pierce et al. (2003; 2001) argue that 
psychological ownership can satisfy three underlying human motives. First, it can 
nurture feelings of efficacy, since "to have" is the ultimate form of control, 
whereby being in control leads to the perception that one "is the cause" and that 
one has altered or is able to alter the circumstances (Beggan, 1992). Second, 
ownership feelings help people define themselves, express their self-identity to 
others and maintain the continuity of the self. As such, possessions or what is 
perceived to be mine can have an identity forging and maintaining function 
(Kamptner, 1989; Price et al., 2000). Finally, having a place, and hence the need 
for territoriality and security may also be nurtured by ownership feelings (Porteous, 
1976). Furthermore, Pierce et al. (2001; 2003) conceptualize three potentially 
interrelating routes that lead to psychological ownership: intimately knowing the 
target of ownership feelings, having control over it, and investing oneself into it. 
So far, only the route of control has been empirically validated (Pierce et al., 2004). 
Research still has to address "the conditions in organizations, work groups and 
individuals that enhance psychological ownership" (Avey et al., 2009, p. 186).  
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On the outcome side, numerous positive effects of psychological ownership 
among employees have been validated, such as affective commitment (e.g., Avey 
et al., 2009; Mayhew et al., 2007; Van Dyne & Pierce, 2004), job satisfaction 
(Avey et al., 2009; Pierce et al., 1992; Van Dyne & Pierce, 2004), organizational 
citizenship behavior (Avey et al., 2009), and organization-based self-esteem (Van 
Dyne & Pierce, 2004).  
Psychological ownership is a distinct concept because of the sense of 
possession as conceptual core (cp. Pierce et al., 2001; Van Dyne & Pierce, 2004). 
Psychological ownership asks, "How much do I feel this organization is mine" 
(Van Dyne & Pierce, 2004, p. 443); organizational commitment asks, "Why should 
I maintain my membership in this organization" (cp. Meyer & Allen, 1997; Van 
Dyne & Pierce, 2004); organizational identification asks, "Who am I" (Dutton et 
al., 1994); and job involvement asks, "How important is the job and job 
performance to my self-image?" (Lawler & Hall, 1970) Only recently, scholars 
have begun investigating psychological ownership in the family business context 
(e.g., Bernhard & O’Driscoll, 2011; Bernhard & Sieger, 2009; Sieger, 2010). This 
seems promising, as employee stock ownership plans, which are commonly used to 
foster employees’ favorable work attitudes and behaviors, oppose the dominant 
wish of many families to control legal ownership across generations (Chua et al., 
1999; Gomez-Mejia et al., 2007). Psychological ownership, in contrast, can exist in 
the absence of formal ownership, while potentially leading to similar effects. For 
the actual evolvement of ownership feelings, family firms may constitute a unique 
context. For instance, when the family business is closely controlled by the family, 
non-family employees might perceive a low level of own personal control over the 
business, one of the main routes to psychological ownership. In addition, ingroup-
outgroup perceptions (cp. Barnett & Kellermanns, 2006) might bring non-family 
employees to perceive themselves as being outside the group of owners, which 
might impede the evolvement of ownership feelings. In contrast, when non-family 
employees perceive to be part of the family, for example through very long tenure, 
this might foster ownership feelings. As outlined in the following, also perceptions 
of justice or injustice may affect non-family employees' ownership feelings. 
86 
 
5.3.3 Affective commitment and job satisfaction 
Affective commitment and job satisfaction are described as "the two most 
commonly researched employee attitudes" (Van Dyne & Pierce, 2004, p. 440). 
Meyer and Allen (1991) differentiate between affective, normative, and 
continuance commitment. Affective commitment is regarded as the most widely 
studied form (Lavelle et al., 2009; Meyer et al., 2002; Pierce et al., 2003). It is 
defined as "affective or emotional attachment to the organization such that the 
strongly committed individual identifies with, is involved in, and enjoys 
membership in the organization" (Allen & Meyer, 1990, p. 2). In the context of 
family firms, affective commitment is of special relevance. For instance, family 
firms are characterized by long term orientation (Chua et al., 1999; Klein et al., 
2005). In addition, they have a stronger tendency to keep their employees even in 
times of economic crises (Lee, 2006). Altogether, this is likely to lead to increased 
trust, feelings of job security, and a higher level of affective commitment 
(Astrachan & Kolenko, 1994; Le Breton-Miller & Miller, 2006). Fostering non-
family employees' affective commitment is essential as family firms may have 
disadvantages in attracting new hires and thus have to rely more on existing 
employees (Michael-Tsabari, Lavee, & Hareli, 2008). Moreover, recent findings 
indicate that non-family employees' affective commitment is positively related to 
the profitability and survival of family firms (Vallejo, 2009). Thus, it is surprising 
that there is relatively little literature specifically dedicated to the affective 
commitment of non-family employees in family businesses (cp. Bird et al., 2002; 
Dyer, 2003).  
Job satisfaction is another important work attitude (cp. Heller & Watson, 2005; 
Ilies, Wilson, & Wagner, 2009; Van Dyne & Pierce, 2004). It has been commonly 
defined as an attitudinal evaluative judgment of one's job or job experiences (Ilies 
et al., 2009). It basically asks, "How do I evaluate my job?" (Van Dyne & Pierce, 
2004, p. 444). Family business literature has mainly investigated job satisfaction 
with regard to family members. In that context, numerous scholars have 
concentrated on the relationships between work and family domains and their 
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effects on job satisfaction (cp. Edwards & Rothbard, 2000; Kossek & Ozeki, 
1998). Investigated factors in that context are work-family conflict, family 
cohesion and family adaptability (Boles, 1996; Lee, 2006). While Lumpkin, Martin 
and Vaughn (2008) pointed out that the family orientation of non-family 
employees might have an effect on their job satisfaction, there are very few 
empirical studies explicitly examining non-family employees' job satisfaction (for 
instance, see Beehr et al., 1997).  
 
5.4 Hypotheses 
5.4.1 Organizational justice dimensions and psychological ownership 
5.4.1.1 Distributive justice and psychological ownership 
Equity theory posits that employees perceive justice when they receive resource 
allocations that commensurate with their contribution to the firm (Adams, 1965). 
Family firms, however, may be prone to violating that allocation norm. For 
instance, the concept of altruism implies that the welfare of the parent is positively 
linked to that of his or her children (Schulze et al., 2003b; Schulze et al., 2001). As 
a consequence, parental altruism can bias the family’s perception about the 
performance of family members, and business families are incentivized to offer 
perquisites, promotional opportunities and salaries to family employees regardless 
of their individual contribution to the firm (Lubatkin et al., 2007). An example is 
appointing a family member to a specific position even though a non-family 
employee would be better qualified (Gersick, Davis, Hampton, & Lansberg, 1997). 
When the norm of merit (cp. Lansberg, 1983) is replaced or weakened through 
altruism or general favoritism of family members (Lubatkin et al., 2007; Schulze et 
al., 2001), this is likely to lead to perceptions of distributive injustice by non-
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family employees. Even though non-family employees might expect or even accept 
a certain extent of preferential treatment of family members (Gersick et al., 1997), 
perceptions of injustice may arise as soon as the "non-family employees' zone of 
indifference" is left (Lubatkin et al., 2007, p. 965). As mentioned previously, 
however, even though family firms are particularly vulnerable to the violation of 
distributive justice rules, this does not necessarily have to be the case. 
The level of justice that non-family employees perceive with regard to outcome 
distributions such as pay and promotion has important effects on their relationship 
with the organization. Accountability considerations imply that individuals identify 
the party that is responsible for justice or injustice, which in turn affects their 
attitudes toward that party (cp. Folger & Cropanzano, 1998). Pay policies, 
compensation and promotion schemes in firms are mostly set by the firm itself (see 
also Walumbwa et al., 2009). Consequently, when non-family employees perceive 
pay and promotion to be unjust, they are also likely to perceive the family firm as 
unjust. In contrast, if these outcomes are perceived as just, this applies to the 
family firm as well. This, in turn, supports a more favorable relationship between 
the employee and the organization (cp. Colquitt et al., 2001; Fortin, 2008). With 
increased justice, a just family firm appears attractive to non-family employees. 
Favorable judgments are related to possessive feelings (Beggan, 1992), and Pierce 
et al. (2003) state that "attributes like attractiveness […] render the target more or 
less subject to psychological ownership" (p. 94).  
Also resource investment considerations may play a role. Janssen, Lam and 
Huang (2009) propose that employees who perceive their resource investments to 
be fairly compensated by the organization will be motivated and encouraged to 
increasingly invest their personal resources. These personal resources can be 
intelligence, experience, training, skill, time, energy, and cognitive and emotional 
labor (Janssen et al., 2009). A high level of distributive justice thus fosters the 
employees' resource investment. In a similar vein, Loi, Hang-yue and Foley (2006) 
argue that when employees perceive distributive justice in an economic exchange 
relationship, they are motivated to repay and increase their self-investment in the 
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organization. At the same time, the investment of "time, ideas, skills and physical, 
psychological, and intellectual energies" (Pierce et al., 2001: 302) has been 
proposed to be one of the three main routes leading to psychological ownership 
(Pierce et al., 2003; Pierce et al., 2001).  
Summing up, there is good reason to believe that distributive justice 
perceptions render the family firm into a more attractive object to be 
psychologically appropriated, and that they will also foster the investment of non-
family employees’ personal resources. This will ultimately strengthen non-family 
employees' ownership feelings toward the family business. More formally stated:  
Hypothesis 1: Distributive justice perceptions of non-family employees 
are positively related to their psychological ownership toward the family 
business.  
5.4.1.2 Procedural justice and psychological ownership  
For procedural justice, six criteria have been established that employees 
normally evaluate. Just procedures are suggested to be based on accurate 
information, free of bias, applied consistently across people and time, have a 
mechanism to correct flaws, consider the opinions of several affected groups, and 
conform to ethical standards (Colquitt et al., 2001; Leventhal, 1980). Family firms 
face a higher risk of violating one or several of these rules. For instance, family 
firms are sometimes described to avoid establishing formal procedures, which can 
impede the quality and accuracy of internal information flows (Gomez-Mejia, 
Nunez-Nickel, & Gutierrez, 2001; Schulze et al., 2001). Moreover, due to non-
family employees’ family outsider status, they have less institutional influence to 
suggest corrective actions and to express their opinion compared to family 
members (Lubatkin et al., 2007). The danger of violating the six criteria may be 
exacerbated for instance by founder-centric cultures (Schein, 1983) or authoritarian 
leadership styles (Tagiuri & Davis, 1992). The allocation process through which 
outcomes such as pay and promotion are distributed is then likely to be conducted 
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top-down, without the possibility for non-family employees to adequately have a 
voice. Even though scholars found that non-family employees regularly complain 
about a lack of voice with respect to family firm decision making (Van der 
Heyden, Blondel, & Carlock, 2005), this might not be necessarily the case for all 
family firms. Rather, if the controlling family is aware of these dangers, they can 
take actions and implement mechanisms to avoid such situations .  
The extent to which procedures applied in the context of an appraisal interview, 
the most commonly investigated allocation process (cp. Barnett & Kellermanns, 
2006; Colquitt et al., 2001), are affected by these factors, has a direct effect on 
non-employees’ procedural justice perceptions and their subsequent ownership 
feelings for the organization. Appraisal interview procedures are likely to be 
developed by the organization and are only carried out by a supervisor. Drawing 
from the discussion about sources of justice perceptions (Malatesta & Byrne, 1997; 
Masterson et al., 2000; Masterson & Taylor, 1996) and accountability (Folger & 
Cropanzano, 1998), the family firm will then be held accountable for justice or 
injustice (Masterson et al., 2000). Hence, non-family employees tend to consider 
the family firm to be just, if they perceive the procedures to be just (cp. Folger & 
Cropanzano, 1998). This link can also be clarified by considering the difference 
between event-based and entity-based judgments. Event-based judgments refer to 
an individual's fairness assessment of a specific event or experience, such as an 
appraisal interview. Entity-based judgments, in turn, are aggregated event 
perceptions to form a summary judgment of a social entity, such as an organization 
(cp. Cropanzano et al., 2001). Fair procedures go along with the perception of a 
fair organization, which is supported by Hollensbe, Khazanchi and Masterson 
(2008). Additional empirical support for a high correlation between event and 
entity-based judgments is provided by Konovsky and Pugh (1994). When the 
family firm as a whole is consequently perceived as just, it becomes a more 
desirable object to be psychologically appropriated (Pierce et al. 2003).  
Furthermore, just procedures allow non-family employees to control, predict, 
and maximize the favorability of outcomes in the long term (cp. Cropanzano et al., 
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2001; Greenberg, 1990; Shapiro, 1993; Thibaut & Walker, 1975). If just 
procedures are in place and are perceived as such, non-family employees perceive 
to have influence and control over the instruments and processes through which 
relevant job-related outcomes are determined. This can be regarded as a proxy for 
control over the employee's work environment and related issues in general (cp. 
Pierce et al., 2001). Perceived control, in turn, satisfies the human motive of 
efficacy and is the only empirically validated main route to psychological 
ownership (Pierce et al., 2004).  
Summing up, just procedures in the context of an appraisal interview will make 
non-family employees perceive that the family firm as a whole is just, which 
facilitates the evolvement of ownership feelings. In addition, just procedures give 
non-family employees a sense of influence and control, which is one of the main 
antecedents to psychological ownership. Based on these considerations we offer 
the following hypothesis:  
Hypothesis 2: Procedural justice perceptions of non-family employees are 
positively related to their psychological ownership toward the family 
business.  
5.4.2 The mediating effects of psychological ownership 
We propose psychological ownership of non-family employees as a mediator in 
the relationships between justice perceptions and favorable work outcomes due to 
numerous reasons. First, many studies have reported positive relationships between 
both distributive and procedural justice and affective commitment (e.g., Begley et 
al., 2006; Greenberg, 1994; Jones & Martens, 2009; Lowe & Vodanovich, 1995), 
and between both justice dimensions and job satisfaction (Jones & Martens, 2009; 
e.g., Lam et al., 2002; Masterson et al., 2000). This should also hold in the context 
of family firms. When non-family employees perceive that they are fairly 
compensated and treated in the procedure to arrive at these outcomes, this is likely 
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to have positive effects on their affective commitment to the family firm and to 
their job satisfaction (cp. also Kets de Vries, 1993). Second, as illustrated above, 
we propose a positive relationship between both distributive and procedural justice 
perceptions and psychological ownership of non-family employees. Third, 
psychological ownership has been linked to both affective commitment and job 
satisfaction. Feelings of ownership satisfy the basic human need for place 
(Porteous, 1976), and non-family employees thus view the family firm as a place in 
which to dwell (Dittmar, 1992; Furby, 1978a; Pierce et al., 2001). This induces a 
feeling of attachment and belonging, which is the essence of affective commitment 
(cp. Van Dyne & Pierce, 2004). Scholars also argue that feelings of possession 
enhance general satisfaction and provide a context or environment in which job 
satisfaction is embedded and positively influenced (Kozlowski & Klein, 2000; Van 
Dyne & Pierce, 2004). We believe that these relationships also apply to the context 
of non-family employees in family firms.  
Based on above assertions it seems reasonable to introduce psychological 
ownership as a mediator between distributive justice and both affective 
commitment and job satisfaction, as well as between procedural justice and the 
same attitudinal outcomes. When family firms are able to induce perceptions of 
justice among their non-family employees despite potential family business 
specific pitfalls, this will give rise to ownership feelings, which in turn will 
positively affect non-family employees’ affective commitment and job satisfaction. 
These arguments lead us to the following mediation hypotheses:  
Hypothesis 3: Psychological ownership of non-family employees toward 
the family business mediates the relationship between their distributive 
justice perceptions and their affective commitment. 
Hypothesis 4: Psychological ownership of non-family employees toward 
the family business mediates the relationship between their procedural 
justice perceptions and their affective commitment. 
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Hypothesis 5: Psychological ownership of non-family employees toward 
the family business mediates the relationship between their distributive 
justice perceptions and their job satisfaction. 
Hypothesis 6: Psychological ownership of non-family employees toward 
the family business mediates the relationship between their procedural 
justice perceptions and their job satisfaction 
The theoretical model is illustrated with the following figure.  
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5.5 Method 
5.5.1 Sample and data collection 
The sample consists of the responses of 1,024 employees of companies based in 
Germany and German-speaking Switzerland. In 2009, we randomly retrieved 
10’750 valid email addresses of management-level employees from these 
countries' largest employee database. An identification-based online survey 
instrument prevented multiple responses. We achieved a response rate of 9.5% by 
using one reminder email. Research has found that a 10-12% response rate is 
typical for studies that target executives in upper echelons (Geletkanycz, 1998; 
Koch & McGrath, 1996) and managers in small to mid-sized firms (MacDougall & 
Robinson, 1990). In addition, sending emails without prior notice generates lower 
response rates than other approaches (Kaplowitz et al., 2004). Given the 
circumstances, our response rate can thus be regarded as adequate. We only 
included fully completed questionnaires and respondents that were working in a 
family firm. The criteria were at least one family member in an operational 
position, majority of equity ownership in the family's hands, and the employees' 
perception that it is a family business (cp. Astrachan et al., 2002; Nordqvist & 
Zellweger 2010). In addition, family members were excluded, which reduced the 
final sample to 310 employees. 26% of them were female, with an average age of 
45.25 years, and an average tenure of 12.06 years. Average company age was 81.2 
years, and average company size was 847.64 employees.  
5.5.2 Measures 
To measure distributive and procedural justice we relied on a validated German 
version (Maier, Streicher, Jonas, & Woschée, 2007) of the widely applied measure 
by Colquitt (2001). Following Colquitt (2001), distributive justice referred to the 
outcome non-family employees receive from their work (pay and promotion) based 
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on their last appraisal interview, and procedural justice referred to the process 
applied in that interview (cp. also Masterson et al., 2000). Sample items were 
"Does your appraisal interview outcome (e.g., salary, promotion, raise) reflect the 
effort you have put into your work?" (distributive justice) and "Have you been able 
to express your views and feelings during your last appraisal interview?" 
(procedural justice). All items in the study were rated from 1 = strongly disagree to 
7 = strongly agree on a seven-point Likert-type scale. We pre-tested the scale with 
90 employees and found low factor loadings (< 0.6) for the same items as Maier et 
al. (2007), leading to 4 items for distributive and 5 items for procedural justice (cp. 
Nunnally & Bernstein, 1994). A factor analysis confirmed this factor structure. 
Cronbach's Alphas were 0.95 and 0.85. All items used in this study can be found in 
the Appendix. 
For psychological ownership we relied on a seven item measure developed by 
Pierce et al. (1992), with further validation provided by numerous scholars (e.g., 
Mayhew et al., 2007; O’Driscoll et al., 2006; Pierce et al., 2004). Sample items 
included "I feel a very high degree of personal ownership for this organization" 
and "This is MY organization". After translating the scale into German, two 
independent bilingual experts who did not know the original scale retranslated it 
into English. Together with a native English speaker we compared the English 
version of the scale with our translation. No major differences were found. 
Cronbach's Alpha was 0.89. For affective commitment we relied on the scale by 
Allen and Meyer (1990) and its validated German version (Felfe, Six, Schmook, & 
Knorz, 2004). We used the six items that exhibited the highest factor loadings (> 
0.6) in our pre-test. Sample items were "I would be very happy to spend the rest of 
my career with this organization" or "This organization has a great deal of 
personal meaning for me". Cronbach's Alpha was 0.93. We used a three item 
measure inspired by van Dyne and Pierce (2004), Mayhew et al. (2007), and Zhou, 
Li, Zhou and Su (2008) to measure job satisfaction, whereas the same translation 
procedure as described above was enacted. Sample items were "I like the things 
that I do at work" and "In general, I am very satisfied with my job". Cronbach's 
Alpha was 0.81.  
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We used several control variables. As conceptualizations of ownership can 
differ between countries due to varying legal arrangements and social programs 
(Rousseau & Shperling, 2003), we included dummy variables for Germany and 
Switzerland. Moreover, the competitive environment may impact firm behaviour 
(Antoncic & Hisrich, 2001; Porter, 1985), and consequently employees' feelings 
and attitudes. Thus, we added dummy variables for industry and service sectors. 
We also controlled for employees' age (McFarlin & Sweeney, 1992), gender (Lee, 
Pillutla, & Law, 2000), tenure (Meyer et al., 2002), hierarchy level (Begley et al., 
2006), and stock ownership (Daily, Dalton et al., 2003; Van Dyne & Pierce, 2004). 
Other controls were firm age and size, whereas the latter was measured by the 
number of employees (cp. Choi & Chen, 2007; Wallace, 1995). As it was not 
normally distributed, we transformed it using the natural logarithm. Furthermore, 
we included the company's current performance, as the study variables might be 
affected when the company is perceived as successful and thus attractive (cp. 
Pierce et al., 2003). We adapted a measure by Eddleston and Kellermanns (2007), 
including three items pertaining to the company’s development of sales, market 
share, and profits in comparison to its competitors. Cronbach's Alpha was 0.91.  
 
5.6 Analysis 
To explore the possibility of non-response bias, we compared early and late 
respondents using ANOVA, as late respondents are more similar to non-
respondents than early respondents (Chrisman, Chua, & Litz, 2004; Oppenheim, 
1966). No significant differences in the mean scores of the variables were found. 
To address the potential of common method bias we used Harman's one factor test 
(1967) as suggested by Podsakoff and Organ (1986). Following Podsakoff, 
MacKenzie, Lee, & Podsakoff (2003), we entered all our study variables into a 
factor analysis, extracting a 11-factor solution, accounting for 74.32% of total 
variance. The first factor explained 25.23% of variance, providing initial evidence 
that common method bias was not a major problem because no single factor 
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accounted for the majority of variance. As an additional precaution and to assess 
the validity and distinctiveness of our measures, we conducted a confirmatory 
factor analysis (Podsakoff et al., 2003). Specifically, we compared the fit of a five-
factor structure with our main variables to that of a one-factor structure. The five-
factor structure fits the data significantly better (difference in χ2=3180.922, df = 
10, p < 0.001). This indicates that our measures were not only theoretically but also 
empirically distinguishable, and further mitigate common method bias concerns 
(Podsakoff et al., 2003). To deal with potential multicollinearity we centered the 
variables (cp. Cronbach, 1987) and found that the Variance Inflation Factor did not 
exceed 2.357, and the condition index did not exceed 13.752, suggesting that 
multicollinearity is not a concern (Hair et al., 2006). While our statistical tests 
mitigate common method bias and multicollinearity concerns, we have to note that 
the correlation between distributive and procedural justice is high. This is 
regrettable, but seems to be a common problem in organizational justice research 
(cp. Choi & Chen, 2007; Erdogan et al., 2006; Judge & Colquitt, 2004; Spell & 
Arnold, 2007; Walumbwa et al., 2009). To investigate the mediating effects we 
followed Baron and Kenny (1986) and tested the mediation effects' significance 
with the Sobel test (cp. MacKinnon, Lockwood, Hoffman, West, & Sheets, 2002). 
 
5.7 Results 
Means, standard deviations, and Pearson correlations are reported next.  
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Our hypotheses are tested in in the next Table4. Hypotheses 1 and 2 are 
investigated in model 1. Adding distributive and procedural justice significantly 
increases explained variance over and above the control model (adjusted R square 
= 0.177). We find a significant and positive relationship between distributive 
justice and psychological ownership (r = 0.148, p < 0.05), which confirms 
hypothesis 1. However, the relationship between procedural justice and 
psychological ownership is not significant, which rejects hypothesis 2.  
For mediation to occur, three conditions must be met (Baron & Kenny, 1986). 
First, the independent variable must affect the mediator. This applies only for 
distributive justice (model 1). Second, the independent variable must affect the 
dependent variable. In model 2, we find a significant relationship between 
distributive justice and affective commitment (r = 0.212, p < 0.01), but not for 
procedural justice and affective commitment, while the explained variance of the 
model increases significantly (adjusted R square = 0.209). Third, when 
investigating the effects of the independent variable and the mediator on the 
dependent variable simultaneously, the effect of the mediator has to be significant, 
and the effect of the dependent variable has to be weaker than in condition 2 (cp. 
Baron & Kenny, 1986). Model 3 shows that psychological ownership is 
significantly related to affective commitment (r = 0.298, p < 0.001), while the 
effect of distributive justice is weaker but significant (r = 0.168, p < 0.05). Adding 
psychological ownership significantly increases explained variance over and above 
model 2 (adjusted R square = 0.280). This indicates partial mediation and supports 
hypothesis 3. The Sobel test confirms this finding (z = 3.687, p < 0.001). 
Hypothesis 4, however, has to be rejected. Referring to job satisfaction, adding 
both dimensions of justice perceptions increases explained variance of model 4 
over and above the control model (adjusted R square = 0.228). Model 4 shows that 
distributive justice is significantly related to job satisfaction (r = 0.313, p < 0.001), 
while procedural justice is not. When psychological ownership is added in model 
5, which significantly increases explained variance compared to model 4 (adjusted 
                                                           
4
  To improve readability we did not report the different control models.  
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R square = 0.257), psychological ownership is significant (r = 0.197, p < 0.001), 
whereas the effect of distributive justice is weaker but significant (r = 0.284, p < 
0.001). The Sobel test confirms this effect (z = 2.846, p < 0.01), lending support to 
hypothesis 5, whereas hypothesis 6 has to be rejected.  
Variables Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 
      
Dependent variable 
Psych. 
ownersh. 
Affective 
comm. 
Affective 
comm. 
Job satisf. Job satisf. 
      
Control variables      
      
Switzerland -0.133 -0.034 0.005 0.052 0.078 
Germany -0.081 -0.012 0.012 0.005 0.020 
Industry 0.115 0.039 0.005 0.119* 0.096 
Service 0.006 -0.015 -0.017 0.036 0.034 
Employee age 0.061 -0.059 -0.077 -0.041 -0.053 
Gender -0.096 0.029 0.058 0.015 0.034 
Tenure 0.079 0.252*** 0.228*** 0.078 0.063 
Hierarchy level 0.255*** 0.206** 0.130* 0.019 -0.032 
Share ownership -0.065 0.000 0.019 0.035 0.047 
Company age 0.035 -0.040 -0.050 0.013 -0.020 
Company size (ln) -0.031 -0.125* -0.115* -0.099 -0.093 
Current perf. 0.102 0.230*** 0.200*** 0.164** 0.144** 
      
Independent variables / 
mediator 
     
      
Distributive justice 0.148* 0.212** 0.168* 0.313*** 0.284*** 
Procedural justice 0.031 0.011 0.001 0.113 0.107 
Psychological ownership   0.298***  0.197*** 
      
Adjusted R2 0.177 0.209 0.280 0.228 0.257 
F-Statistics 5.758*** 6.842*** 9.009*** 7.509*** 8.133*** 
Delta R2 0.026** 0.042*** 0.070*** 0.138*** 0.031*** 
      
Sobel test (for distributive justice and affective commitment): z = 3.687, p < 0.001 
Sobel test (for distributive justice and job satisfaction): z = 2.846, p < 0.01 
N=310; *p < .05; **p < .01; ***p < .001 
Table 9: Results of regression analyses of paper 3 
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5.8 Discussion 
Our study set out to investigate non-family employees’ justice perceptions and 
how they are connected with pro-organizational outcomes through psychological 
ownership. The gained insights constitute a number of valuable contributions.  
First, we add to family business literature. Research on justice perceptions of 
non-family employees is scarce, and our study represents one of the very few 
empirical studies (cp. Barnett & Kellermanns, 2006; Carsrud, 2006). By drawing a 
fine-grained picture of how justice perceptions of non-family employees weave 
their way into relevant outcomes, we increase the understanding of how family 
firms can foster their employees' value-creating attitudes (Barnett & Kellermanns, 
2006; Chrisman, Chua, & Litz, 2003; Chua, Chrisman, & Sharma, 2003). We are 
the first to both theoretically and empirically link non-family employees’ justice 
perceptions and ownership feelings in the family firm context. Moreover, we are 
able to validate psychological ownership as a mediator between distributive justice 
and both affective commitment and job satisfaction. Compensating non-family 
employees in a just manner despite potential family business-specific pitfalls can 
induce ownership feelings towards the family firm, and ultimately positive 
attitudinal outcomes, which offers a new explanation how the mechanism 
connecting justice perceptions and favorable outcomes might look like. In contrast, 
our finding that a just process in the context of appraisal interviews is not able to 
trigger ownership feelings indicates that non-employees rather regard the 
supervisor responsible for justice, and that this assessment is not transferred to the 
family business as a whole. Furthermore, we elaborated that psychological 
ownership can be especially interesting for family firms that avoid sharing formal 
ownership with non-family members. Potentially inducing similar effects as 
traditional equity ownership plans, it avoids the inherent disadvantages of these 
programs. Our empirical results confirm the unique potential of psychological 
ownership in the family firm context.  
Second, we contribute to the field of organizational justice. On one hand, we 
offer detailed theoretical reasoning and validate the relationship between 
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distributive justice and psychological ownership. On the other hand, psychological 
ownership offers a new perspective in understanding the mechanism that connects 
justice perceptions and organization-related outcomes, which complements 
existing approaches (e.g., Masterson et al., 2000; Tyler & Blader, 2000; Van den 
Bos et al., 2001) and addresses an acknowledged research gap (Choi & Chen, 
2007). Moreover, our finding that procedural justice perceptions do not affect non-
employees‘ attitudes toward the organizational as a whole might challenge 
traditional assumptions of organizational justice scholars (e.g., Bies & Moag, 1986; 
Walumbwa et al., 2009).  
Third, we add to psychological ownership literature. In general, our study joins 
the young stream of research that investigates psychological ownership in a family 
firm context. We are the first to validate psychological ownership as a mediator 
between justice perceptions and both affective commitment and job satisfaction, 
which adds to knowledge on psychological ownership in general (Pierce et al., 
2003). Establishing a link between distributive justice perceptions and 
psychological ownership extends the initial findings of Chi & Han (2008) and 
addresses the call of Avey et al. (2009) to further investigate psychological 
ownership’s antecedents (cp. also Pierce et al., 2004).  
Fourth, our insights are of value for family business practitioners. We 
encourage them to pay close attention to the distribution of salaries and 
promotions. Related perceptions of injustice can impede the evolvement of 
ownership feelings, and ultimately affective commitment and job satisfaction. 
Family business practitioners should thus be aware of the dangers of altruism and 
favoritism of family members, and should try to allocate salaries and promotions 
strictly depending on the contribution that each individual adds to the family firm. 
In general, distributive justice seems to be more essential than procedural justice 
when fostering non-family employees’ value-creating attitudes. In addition, due to 
the positive effects of psychological ownership, we encourage family business 
practitioners to take actions beyond fostering distributive justice in order to 
enhance ownership feelings, such as for instance increasing perceptions of control.  
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5.9 Limitations 
First, we have to address the issue of causality in this study. As the study is 
based on cross-sectional data, we cannot derive solid claims about the direction of 
our effects. It could be argued that when non-family employees exhibit ownership 
feelings toward the family firm they are working for, this could induce them to 
evaluate the distribution of outcomes as well as the corresponding process in a 
more favorable manner. However, even though we cannot substantiate the 
direction of the effects empirically, previous theoretical considerations lend 
support to the presented model (Chi & Han, 2008; Pierce et al., 2003; Pierce et al., 
1991). Another limitation is that all variables were measured by the responses of a 
single source. However, due to theoretical reasons we have to rely on non-family 
employees' subjective justice perceptions, ownership feelings, and their individual 
affective commitment and job satisfaction. Thus, this measurement approach can 
be justified. In addition, several tests mitigate common method bias concerns. 
Lastly, respondents were all working in firms based in Germany or German-
speaking Switzerland, which could lead to a cultural bias.  
 
5.10 Future research 
Our research opens up several avenues for future research. Most importantly, 
we strongly encourage other researchers to further investigate the role of 
psychological ownership in the relationship between justice perceptions and 
attitudinal outcomes of non-family employees. Here, the influence of family 
business specific variables could be addressed as a next step, such as level of 
family involvement (Barnett & Kellermanns, 2006), family ownership, family 
conflicts (Boles, 1996), governance systems, or image and reputation. In addition, 
we only found partial mediating effects for psychological ownership, which speaks 
for the existence of other mechanisms and processes in the distributive justice – 
affective commitment and distributive justice – job satisfaction relationships. We 
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therefore encourage future studies to develop comprehensive models addressing 
the specific role and weight of psychological ownership compared with other 
suggested mediators such as self-esteem (Tyler & Blader, 2000), trust (e.g., Lind, 
2001; Van den Bos et al., 2001), and organizational identification (Carmon et al., 
2010). Furthermore, psychological ownership as a mediator could be applied to 
other outcomes such as organizational citizenship behavior or company 
performance. Exploring causality effects with longitudinal data and validating our 
results in other cultural contexts may also be fruitful avenues of future research. 
For psychological ownership scholars it may be worthwhile to examine the link 
between different justice dimensions and psychological ownership in more detail. 
For example, a mediating effect of employees’ perceived control in these 
relationships could be explicitly studied (cp. Pierce et al., 2003). 
 
5.11 Conclusion 
Addressing the important issue of non-family employees’ justice perceptions 
and how they lead to pro-organizational outcomes, we successfully validate 
psychological ownership as an alternative mediator in the relationship between 
organizational justice perceptions and affective commitment as well as job 
satisfaction. Our findings constitute valuable additions to family business research, 
organizational justice and psychological ownership literature, and to practice.  
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5.12 Appendix 
Construct Item text FL α 
Distributive 
Justice 
The following items refer to your outcome (e.g. salary, 
promotion, raise) of your last appraisal interview. To what 
extent: 
 0.95 
Does your appraisal interview outcome (e.g. salary, promotion, 
raise) reflect the effort you have put into your work? 
0.91 
Is your outcome of the appraisal interview (e.g. salary, 
promotion, raise) appropriate for the work you have completed? 
0.89 
Does your appraisal interview outcome (e.g. salary, promotion, 
raise) reflect what you have contributed to the organization? 
0.88 
Is your outcome of the appraisal interview (e.g. salary, 
promotion, raise)  justified, given your performance? 
0.89 
Procedural 
Justice 
The following items refer to the procedures used to arrive at 
your outcomes at your last appraisal interview. To what extent: 
 0.85 
Have you been able to express your views and feelings during 
the appraisal interview? 
0.51 
Have you had influence over the outcome (e.g. salary, 
promotion, raise) arrived at by the appraisal interview? 
0.31 
Have the appraisal interviews been applied consistently? 0.71 
Have the appraisal interview been based on accurate 
information? 
0.74 
Have the appraisal interview upheld ethical and moral 
standards? 
0.51 
Psycholo-
gical 
Ownership 
Please indicate the degree to which you agree to the following 
statements.  
 0.89 
This is MY organization. 0.81 
I sense that this organization is OUR company. 0.66 
I feel a very high degree of personal ownership for this 
organization 
0.84 
I sense that this is MY company. 0.85 
This is OUR company. 0.66 
It is hard for me to think about this organization as MINE 
(reversed) 
0.69 
Table 10: Scale items, factor loadings, and reliabilities of paper 3 
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Affective 
Commitment 
Please indicate the degree to which you agree to the following 
statements. 
 0.93 
I would be very happy to spend the rest of my career with this 
organization.  
0.66 
I feel like 'part of the family' at my organization. 0.81 
I feel 'emotionally attached' to this organization. 0.87 
I really feel as if this organization's problems are my own. 0.83 
I feel a strong sense of belonging to my organization. 0.88 
This organization has a great deal of personal meaning for me.  0.87 
Job 
satisfaction 
I like the things that I do at work.  0.79 0.81 
My job is very pleasing.  0.83 
In general, I am very satisfied with my job.   0.60 
Table 10: Scale items, factor loadings, and reliabilities of paper 3 (continued) 
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6 Concluding chapter 
6.1 Summary of theoretical and practical contributions 
Each of the three papers enhances existing knowledge about one core element 
of family firms' long-term success. Taken together, they thus contribute to our 
general understanding of how long-term success of family firms can be achieved. 
The main contributions of each paper are summarized in the following.  
Based on three Swiss case studies on long-living family firms, the first paper 
reveals that these firms were able to prosper and survive across generations despite 
rather low levels of EO, which contradicts traditional EO assumptions (e.g., Covin 
et al., 2006; Dess et al., 2003; Wiklund, 2006; Wiklund & Shepherd, 2005). The 
more the better, as implicitly suggested by EO literature, does not seem to be true. 
Instead, successful long-living family firms are able to continuously adapt their EO 
profile depending on external and internal conditions. As such, we strongly 
advocate a dynamic perspective on EO. In addition, our case studies show that 
some of the traditional EO dimensions do not seem to fully capture the 
entrepreneurial reality in long-lived family firms. In line with Nordqvist et al. 
(2008), we suggest splitting the autonomy dimension in an external and an internal 
dimension. The same applies to the innovativeness dimension, whereas we identify 
three distinct subcategories of risk taking, namely ownership risk, performance 
hazard risk, and control risk. These findings, together with the unique family 
business specific patterns that we identified for each dimension, constitute valuable 
extensions to literature on EO in the context of family firms (e.g., Martin & 
Lumpkin, 2003; Nordqvist et al., 2008). In addition, these insights on how EO 
affects long-term success could also be of value in the context of non-family firms 
and EO in general (Lumpkin & Dess, 1996; Rauch et al., 2009). By this, family 
business research could give back to where it originally borrowed from (Zahra & 
Sharma, 2004). Family business practitioners could also benefit from the study's 
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results. We clearly illustrate that they do not have to try to be as entrepreneurial as 
possible all the time. Rather, we encourage them to be aware of their EO profile 
with our newly suggested subcategories, and to carefully evaluate and adapt it 
depending on both internal and external conditions.  
By investigating the evolvement of middle-level manager's entrepreneurial 
behavior, the second paper contributes to different streams of literature. First, it 
adds to literature on entrepreneurial behavior of middle-level managers. On one 
hand, psychological ownership is introduced as an individual-level antecedent, 
which addresses an important research gap (Goldsby et al., 2006; Hmieleski & 
Baron, 2009; Hmieleski & Corbett, 2008; Kuratko, Ireland et al., 2005; Schjoedt & 
Shaver, 2007). On the other hand, this study is one of the few to explicitly 
investigate the combination of individual-level and organizational-level 
antecedents. The validated moderation effect of management support in the 
relationship between psychological ownership and entrepreneurial behavior 
illustrates the potential of this approach (cp. Kuratko, 2010; Kuratko, Ireland et al., 
2005; Naffziger et al., 1994). Another finding is that psychological ownership can 
make organizational factors such as work discretion and rewards/reinforcement 
obsolete, as psychological owners boldly move ahead and take their freedom 
regardless of organizational constraints, and do not need additional rewards and 
motivation by the organization. The study also contributes to entrepreneurial 
behavior literature by being the first to apply a measure that incorporates the two 
main elements of middle-level manager's entrepreneurial behavior, namely 
implementing own entrepreneurial actions and supporting others' entrepreneurial 
behavior (Floyd & Lane, 2000; Kuratko, 2010). Second, by validating 
entrepreneurial behavior as new effect, the paper addresses the call of scholars to 
further investigate outcomes of psychological ownership (Avey et al., 2009; 
Pendleton et al., 1998; Van Dyne & Pierce, 2004). Third, a few important 
recommendations to practitioners can be made. While they should try to increase 
ownership feelings among their employees, they should evaluate carefully how the 
organizational surrounding should be designed. While increasing management 
support can be positive, there seem to be no effects of increased work discretion 
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and rewards/reinforcement. Thus, practitioners could direct their efforts elsewhere. 
In general, these findings are applicable in both the family and non-family firm 
context. In the family firm context, however, their importance is assumed to be 
even higher, as traditional means to increase positive employee attitudes and 
behaviors, such as stock ownership programs, are not applicable (Chua et al., 1999; 
Gomez-Mejia et al., 2007). 
Most importantly, the third paper that investigates non-family employees’ 
justice perceptions and how they are connected with pro-organizational outcomes 
through psychological ownership, contributes to family business literature. 
Representing one of the very few empirical studies on non-family employees' 
justice perceptions (cp. Barnett & Kellermanns, 2006; Carsrud, 2006), it increases 
our understanding of how family firms can foster non-family employees' value-
creating attitudes (Barnett & Kellermanns, 2006; Chrisman, Chua, & Litz, 2003; 
Chua, Chrisman, & Sharma, 2003). Second, the validated mediation effect of 
psychological ownership in the distributive justice - affective commitment and job 
satisfaction relationships offers a new explanation to organizational justice scholars 
of how justice perceptions and favorable work attitudes are connected (e.g., 
Masterson et al., 2000; Tyler & Blader, 2000; Van den Bos et al., 2001). With this 
finding the paper also adds to psychological ownership literature by addressing the 
call of Avey et al. (2009) to further investigate psychological ownership’s 
antecedents (cp. also Pierce et al., 2004). These insights could also be transferred 
to the non-family firm context. Lastly, this paper offers valuable recommendations 
to family business practitioners. They are encouraged to objectively evaluate how 
salaries and promotions are distributed within their company. Family businesses 
are especially prone to perceptions of injustice due to potential altruism or 
nepotism. This will have a strong effect on non-family employees' ownership 
feelings, and ultimately positive work attitudes. Thus, family business practitioners 
have to be aware of these dangers They should focus more on distributive justice 
than on procedural justice, whereas also other possibilities to enhance 
psychological ownership, such as perceptions of control, should not be neglected.  
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6.2 Limitations  
It has to be noted that firm-level entrepreneurship and individual-level 
antecedents such as entrepreneurial behavior, affective commitment, and job 
satisfaction, are of course not the only antecedents to long-term success of family 
firms. However, they are certainly very important ones of special relevance in 
family firms. The three papers of this cumulative dissertation thus contribute to our 
understanding of family firms' long-term success, even though also other 
explaining factors exist.  
The limitations of each paper are illustrated in detail in the corresponding 
subchapters. A few central ones, however, should be emphasized here. Regarding 
the first paper, it has to be mentioned that we use a common denominator approach 
(Dyer & Handler, 1994; Hoy & Verser, 1994) by using EO as theoretical lens, 
which is applied in three case studies of mid-sized and long-lived family firms 
from the same country. This might impose certain limitations to the 
generalizability of the respective findings, as the situation in small and young 
family firms or non-family firms might be different. The second and the third paper 
are based on the same dataset, and thus share the same limitations. Even though 
theoretical considerations support the causality of effects that are proposed in both 
papers, they cannot be validated empirically due to the cross-sectional nature of the 
data. In addition, all variables were measured by the self-perceptions of a single 
source, which might lead to biases. These, however, are mitigated by statistical 
tests. Lastly, all employees were working in (family) firms based in Germany and 
German-speaking Switzerland, which might limit the generalizability of the 
findings to other cultural contexts.  
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6.3 Future research 
Under the umbrella of investigating essential determinants of family firms' 
long-term success, the different papers each open up promising ways of future 
research. The most central ones are highlighted in the following.  
The findings of the first paper should encourage scholars to examine the 
specific characteristics of EO in long-lived family firms in more detail. This could 
be done by a longitudinal quantitative study, ideally covering a specific event such 
as a generation change, which would lead to unique insights on how the transition 
between generations impacts the EO profile. In addition, more case studies in more 
countries and industrial contexts could be done. Particular attention could also be 
drawn to the process and influencing factors of how the EO profile is adapted 
across time. This would further enhance our understanding of how the concept of 
EO contributes to long-term success of family firms.  
Future research could build on the findings of the second paper by investigating 
the interaction of psychological ownership with organizational factors in more 
detail. While the findings of the second paper apply to both non-family and family 
firms, explicit research in the family firm context could incorporate family 
business specific factors such as culture or governance systems, which might lead 
to additional valuable insights. Moreover, the findings could be verified by 
collecting longitudinal data from multiple respondents, ideally from supervisors 
and subordinates from the same firm. Through this, additional insights on how 
middle-level managers' entrepreneurial behavior evolves could be gained. A better 
understanding of the genesis of effective corporate entrepreneurship, and 
ultimately long-term firm success, would be of great value to both research and 
practice. 
The third paper could inspire researchers to further investigate the mechanism 
connecting justice perceptions and favorable work outcomes through psychological 
ownership, for instance by including family business specific variables such as 
level of family involvement or family conflicts (Barnett & Kellermanns, 2006; 
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Boles, 1996). Also here, the study's findings could be validated with longitudinal 
and multi-source data. Consequently, this would further add to existing literature of 
how value-creating attitudes of non-family employees can be enhanced, which 
ultimately leads to an increased understanding of how long-term success of family 
firms can be achieved.  
 
6.4 Conclusion 
While the long-term success of family firms is of utmost social and economic 
importance, there is still a need for further research on its determinants. Each of the 
papers in this dissertation addresses one main factor, namely firm-level EO, 
individual-level entrepreneurial behavior, and both affective commitment and job 
satisfaction of non-family employees. The insights gained through case study 
research (first paper) and quantitative research (second and third paper) constitute 
valuable contributions to existing knowledge on specific aspects of these three 
antecedents. Taken together, they constitute an important step in increasing our 
general understanding of how long-term success can be achieved in family firms, 
opening up promising avenues for future research.  
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